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PROLOGUE
"Police Seize 25 in Hilo Protest: Hawaiian Confrontation at Mall."
So read the news headline in September, 1993.1 One hundred twenty
Native Hawaiians in Hilo protested the State Department of Hawaiian
Homelands' lease of 39 acres of trust Homelands to a non-Hawaiian
commercial entity for the Prince Kuhio Plaza shopping mall. The
protesting group, Aupuni 0 Hawai'i, demanded that the mall be
bulldozed and that the land be used for Native Hawaiian farms and
housing. Those Native Hawaiians arrested and later prosecuted for
trespassing defended on the grounds of their "right" to occupy Ha-
waiian Homelands. Members of Aupuni 0 Hawai'i had earlier been
"evicted" as squatters on nearby Homelands in the Keaukaha area of
Hilo.
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"[Mayor] Fasi Vetoes Homestead Tax Exemption." 2 The Honolulu
mayor vetoed City Council legislation exempting Hawaiian Homelands
lessees from paying real property taxes after the first seven years of
their leases. The mayor's office reportedly observed that the exemption
would amount to a form of city-sponsored affirmative action, and thus,
would constitute "reverse racial discrimination against non-Hawai-
ians. ' ' 3 Lawsuits were threatened in support of and against a City
Council override of the exemption.
"Hawaiians Sue to Stop OHA From Attempting to Settle Overthrow
Claims." '4 The Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), a state-created
agency, sought to resolve Native Hawaiian claims against the state and
federal governments for, among other things, breaches of the Hawaii
Ceded Lands Trust. 5 Samuel Kealoha and three other Native Hawaiian
trust beneficiaries filed suit to forestall a $100 million settlement until
the Hawaiian people themselves created a sovereign entity that could
undertake or direct negotiations. They asserted a violation of "the
right of self-determination protected under international law. "6
2 Pat Omandam, Fasi Vetoes Homelands Tax Exemption, HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN,
December 11, 1993, at A-3.
Id.
Bill Meheula and Kawika Liu, Hawaiians Sue to Stop OHA From Attempting to Settle
Overthrow Claims, KE KIA'I, March 1, 1994, vol. 5, no. 3, at 19.
' See infra note 18 for a discussion of the Hawaiian Ceded Lands trust which
targets Hawaiians, among others, as trust beneficiaries.
6 First Amended Complaint at 2, Kealoha v. Hee, Civil No. 94-0188-01 (1st Cir.
Haw., filed Feb. 2, 1994). Samuel L. Kealoha, Jr., Charles Ka'ai'ai, Jonathan
Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, and Lahela Jarrett Holmwood sought to enjoin negotiations,
settlement and the execution of a release by trustees of OHA "concerning claims
against the United States for the overthrow of the Hawaiian government in 1893, and
the redress of breaches of the ceded lands trust committed by the United States and
the State of Hawaii (excluding OHA's right to revenues under Chapter 10)." Id.
Their complaint asserted: "(a) the trustees are or would be in a conflict of interest
and lack statutory authority to attempt to resolve these claims; (b) it would violate
the right to self-determination protected under international law; and (c) a Hawaiian
sovereign nation is the only entity that can conduct such negotiations with the United
States and the State'of Hawaii." Id.
Count V of the Amended Complaint specifically addressed the alleged "Violation
of International Law." It located Native Hawaiians' rights of self-determination in,
among other things: the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights, Articles I,
II and XXVII, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (ratified by United States on
Sept. 8, 1992); the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, dated
August 21, 1993, prepared by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations and
submitted to the United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights; the Universal
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I. INTRODUCTION
Across the country strident debates continue about multiculturalism
in education, diversity in government, and affirmative action in work-
places. Those debates, heightened by the Columbus quincentennial,
have expanded popular discourse to include the effects of Euro-Amer-
ican colonialism on America's indigenous peoples. Grand narratives
about society's treatment of outsiders- slavery, Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,7 the internment,8 and the statue of liberty immigrant experi-
ence-have been challenged as incomplete and exclusionary. They
ignore the physical and cultural domination of America's indigenous
peoples, including American Indians, Native Hawaiians, Eskimos and
Aleuts. Stories of native peoples are now reconfiguring public discourse
about race and culture, and infusing concepts of neo-colonialism,
nationalism, and self-determination into discussions of equality and
diversity.9
These dynamic debates, along with international movements dis-
cussed later, are influencing American legal discourse, albeit at the
periphery. For America's indigenous peoples, rights are no longer
framed entirely by the provisions of the Constitution and legislative
enactments. Indigenous peoples' demands are increasingly asserted
within dual frameworks. One framework is narrow. It consists of rights
claims recognized by the American legal system (e.g., due process
violations or breaches of trust), even though the rights, as framed,
may not accurately embody the cultural, spiritual, and political expe-
rience of the group involved. 10 A second framework is expansive. It
Declaration of Human Rights; and general principles of international law. Amended
Complaint, at 20-26.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the criminal
conviction of an Japanese-American citizen who refused to be interned). See also,
Hirabayashi v. United States 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding the conviction of an
Japanese-American citizen who refused to obey a racially-based curfew).
9 See generally ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1980); Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty And
Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Joseph W. Singer, Property And Coercion In
Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical And Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV., 1821 (1990); Williamson B. C. Chang, The "Wasteland" In The Western
Exploitation Of "Race" And The Environment, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV. 849 (1992).
" For a discussion of the employment of a civil rights statute to advance a breach
of trust claim by the Native Hawaiian community group concerned about control over
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consists of claims of transnational moral authority cast in the language
of international human rights (e.g., right to self-determination).1 1 Those
rights claims are rooted historically in the conquest of indigenous
peoples and morally in the colonizing power's confiscation of land and
suppression of culture.12 Indigenous peoples' assertion of claims within
this expanded framework performs two functions: it challenges the
legitimacy of an "occupying" government's employment of its own
established legal norms to decide the political and cultural rights of
indigenous peoples, and it provides a beginning basis for understanding
how indigenous peoples might reinterpret or transform those established
norms to reflect justice under their circumstances.'
Employing these dual frameworks, narrow and expansive, America's
indigenous peoples' are asserting claims of right in American courts.' 4
Kealoha v. Hee, 15 described in the Prologue, is a current example. But
homelands in its neighborhood, see infra notes 82-110 and accompanying text, addressing
Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Association v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, 739
F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1984).
" See Rosen, Law and Indigenous Peoples, 27 LAW AND SOC. INQ. 363, 365 (1992).
Rosen describes recent efforts to adopt viewpoints of indigenous peoples in addressing
"rights" claims.
(I)nternational bodies have pressed ahead with efforts to codify the rights of
indigenous peoples and to distinguish their situation from that of national
minorities. The result is a body of work that has proceeded on at least three
vital fronts: (1) the examination of the current state of indigenous peoples and
the variety of political and cultural contexts within which they operate; (2) the
historical context-now much re-interpreted--that has led to the current legal
status of native properties and native governments; and (3) specific proposals
for re-configuration of indigenous rights within a revised set of international
conventions.
Id. at 365; see also Mabo v. Queensland, 66 AUSTRALIAN L. J. 408 (1992) (describing
the High Court's social-historical analysis and its rejection of the doctrine of terra
nullius and acceptance of the doctrine of native title).
"2 See Chang, supra note 9. Professor Chang insightfully critiques the inappropri-
ateness of standard anti-discrimination discourse to the situations of indigenous peoples,
contrasting circumstances attendant to voluntary migration of a racial group with those
of conquest of a once sovereign people.
," See infra note 292 (describing Ka'ai'ai v. Drake, Civ. No. 92-3742-10 (1st Cir.
Haw., filed Oct. 1992) which asserted the principle of self-determination as a means
for comprehending Hawaiian Homesteaders' breach of trust claims against the state
to reconstitute a state-created Trust Claims Resolution Task Force that excluded
independent participation by homesteaders).
11 See supra note 6, infra notes 15-19, and 279 and accompanying text.
15 See supra note 6 and accompanying text for the discussion of this case.
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for what purpose? Federal courts in particular have tended to reject
indigenous peoples' political-moral claims framed in the language of
established rights (such as equal protection). 6 Federal and state courts
also have professed lack of authority to apply international human
rights norms to decide matters of what is called "domestic" law. 7 For
many indigenous groups, harsh experience undermines the popular
image of American courts as expositors of fundamental rights and thus
agents of social justice. 18
So why worry about federal and state court access for indigenous
peoples? Why worry about Native Hawaiians' uncertain right to sue?
One response, posited here, is that access to court process for indigenous
peoples may have potential social-political value on multiple levels. 19
16 See, e.g., Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 427
F.2d 1194 (Ct. Cl. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970) (dismissing the tribe's
claims under the "fair and honorable dealing" clause of the Indian Claims Commission
Act as merely "moral" claims beyond the scope of the Act); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (Court recognized aboriginal title to Indian lands
but also asserted the power of the federal government to extinguish native title to non-
treaty land without compensation); Han v. Department of Justice, 824 F. Supp. 1480,
1486 (D. Haw. 1993) (on appeal) ("First, as a matter of law, the federal defendants
have no trust responsibility to plaintiffs or other native Hawaiians under statutory or
case law." Id. at 1486.). See generally WILLIAMS, DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST, supra note
9, at 227-232.
See generally WILLIAMS, DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST, supra note 9.
Professor Nell Jessup Newton observes that "[o]ne of the great contributions to
the tribal rights movements of the 1960s was the development of a cause of action
seeking equitable relief for breach of trust." Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims In The
Courts Of The Conqueror, 41 AMERICAN U. L. REv. 753, 784 (1992) (Indian Claims).
Newton also observes, however, that "despite the promise of [United States v. Mitchell,
463 206 (1983), commonly referred to as "Mitchell II," which recognized jurisdictional
and substantive grounds for breach of trust suits against the federal government],
Indian tribes have been remarkably unsuccessful in breach of trust claims in the
Claims Court and the Federal Circuit." Indian Claims at 789. The "claimants have
succeeded in only two instances of the twenty. . .cases. . in the last ten years"
primarily because the courts have dismissed most claims on statute of limitations
grounds or for "lack of jurisdiction uncer the [Mitchell II]... standards." Id. at 790.
See infra Part II concerning the federal court's restrictive jurisdictional rulings concern-
ing Native Hawaiian breach of trust claims. See generally WILLIAMS, DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST, supra note 9.
"9 Eric Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat To The Value Of Accessible Courts For Minorities,
25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REv. 341 (1990) (Efficiency's Threat) (describing traditionally
and critically viewed values of court access). One perspective is that Native Hawaiian
rights claims in federal court have had a "useful consciousness-raising" effect. The
"recent willingness of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the State of
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The right to sue-to gain system entry and develop, define and present
claims-may have value even in the absence of favorable court decla-
rations of rights. It may have value even though favorable court
declarations of rights rarely lead directly or immediately to fundamental
structural and attitudinal changes.20 Vantage point is key.
From one view, courts are simply deciders of particular disputes
involving specific parties according to established norms. From another
view, courts in addition are integral parts of a larger communicative
process. Particularly in a setting of indigenous peoples' claims, court
process is a "cultural performance."
This article, drawing on Critical Race Theory, cultural anthropology,
and dispute transformation theory, offers a new look at federal courts,
civil rights and civil procedure jurisprudence. As will be described,
indigenous groups are using the federal and state courts not solely to
establish and enforce rights, but also to help focus cultural issues, to
illuminate institutional power arrangements and to tell counter-stories
in ways that assist larger social-political movements. Examining indig-
enous peoples' use of courts as sites and generators of cultural per-
formances sheds light on uses of law in what might be called the "post-
civil rights era." It also highlights the substantive importance of
"procedural rights."
In this context, the community protest in Hilo, the vetoed city tax-
exemption in Honolulu and the international law challenge to the OHA
settlement described in the Prologue are tied with common threads.
They involve Native Hawaiians.2 1 They involve lands "ceded" to the
Hawai'i to address such issues [may] stem from a recognition, after Keaukaha II (see
infra notes 108-113 and accompanying text), that a failure to provide a state forum
would lead to increasing interference by the federal courts in the management of State
lands .. " Letter from attorney Carl Christensen, Native Hawaiian Legal Corpo-
ration to Eric Yamamoto (November 5, 1993) (on file with authors).
20 See DEREK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (describing how court decla-
rations of rights are narrowed, subverted and transformed).
21 We use "Native Hawaiian" as an encompassing term. In doing so, we acknowl-
edge its racially and politically constructed dimensions (see infra note 36) and our
selection among a range of other possible terms. Among other terms are "native
Hawaiian" (used by governmental bodies legally to denote people of at least fifty
percent Hawaiian blood, people who are thereby deemed beneficiaries of the Hawaiian
Homelands Trust), or "Hawaiian" (used popularly to describe people whose ancestors
were the original inhabitants of the islands; also used by governmental bodies legally
to denote people of some Hawaiian blood who are thereby eligible for certain
entitlements), or "Kanaka Maoli" (preferred by several pro-sovereignty groups and
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United States following the United States-aided overthrow of the Ha-
waiian government in 1893-lands now held in two trusts by the State
of Hawai'i as trustee for the benefit of Native Hawaiians. They involve
responses to a history of culture destruction and land dispossession. 2
scholars as a self-defining, non-Westernized term), or "Hawaiian native people" or
"indigenous people of Hawaii" (used to emphasize culture and ancestral origin). We
have selected the term "Native Hawaiian" because most readers will recognize it,
because it emphasizes through the term "Native" that Hawaiian people are indigenous
to the islands, and because the capital "N" in Native distinguishes the term from the
term "native Hawaiian" which has been given its legal construction by the federal
and state governments.
We acknowledge that our use of the term is in some respects overly broad. The
term could be misleadingly construed to imply a singular Native Hawaiian group or
perspective. There is no one Native Hawaiian group, or community, or perspective.
There is no singular Native Hawaiian identity. Culture, class, lineage, historical
memory, geography and gender are among the many factors contributing to vast
differences in lifestyles, group relations, cultural practices and political outlooks. Despite
these differences, we believe the use of the broad term Native Hawaiian is appropriate
for this article for two reasons. First, many people with ancestral ties to the original
inhabitants of the Hawaiian archipelago self-define their identity racially, culturally
and politically in terms of being Hawaiian. Second, while many meaningful differences
among. Native Hawaiian people exist, governmental institutions, including the courts,
historically and currently have tended to address Native Hawaiians as a group. This
article's analytical approach addresses, in part, that collective treatment.
22 Describing traditional Native Hawaiian social structure and culture is a problem-
atic undertaking. See Davianna McGregor, Kupa'a I Ka 'Aina: Persistence on the
Land, 92-94 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hawaiian Pacific Collection,
Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii at Manoa). See generally MARTIN CHANOCK,
LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA
(1985) (cautioning that the concept of indigenous tradition is a colonialist construct).
According to generally acknowledged Hawaiian-centered accounts, Native Hawaiian
social structure was organized around a belief in the unity of people, gods and nature.
Respect for nature translated into respect for, and a spiritual-familial relationship with,
the land and ocean. See McGregor, supra; MELODY KAPILIALOHA MACKENZIE, NATIVE
HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, 3-5 (1991) (describing relationships among Hawaiian
people and the land and the resulting land tenure system). See also LILIKALA
KAME'ELEHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E PONo AI?, 23-25
(1992) (describing the spiritual-familial relationship that Hawaiians had with the land).
A sizeable tract of land, "ahupua'a," stretching from mountain (mauka) to sea (kai),
was farmed and fished by commoners (maka'ainana-literally, eyes of the land) who
were overseen by a chief (ali'i). A commoner worked for a chief; he could, however,
move to another ahupua'a if he was unfairly treated by the chief. This land-people
relationship and the cultural-economic structure it supported were shaken in the early
1800s by the demise of the Hawaiian spiritual-legal "kapu" system, by Western
contact, through the sandalwood and whaling industries, and by the arrival of Christian
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They involve, in varying ways, present group-based claims of self-
determination. And they involve, or are likely to involve, courts as
forums for processing contemporary social-cultural conflicts with deep
historical roots. In each situation, courts will likely be called upon to
serve not only as adjudicators of claims or as expositors of law, but
also as mediators among complex, often dissonant cultural narratives.23
These connecting threads raise questions about the judicial function-
questions with descriptive and normative dimensions. How are the
courts functioning as performance sites in the context of increasingly
frequent and intensifying native peoples' land controversies? And how
will decisions about court process, including courthouse entry, mediate
or transform the often conflicting cultural messages underlying those
controversies?
"Native Hawaiians demand right to sue." So read many a news
missionaries. Western diseases soon decimated the Hawaiian population. An expanding
United States agricultural market, a coterie of American religious and political advisors
to the Hawaiian King, a need for governmental capital and the existence of fertile
land combined to introduce to Hawaii the concept of private fee simple property
ownership. See generally LINDA S. PARKER, NATIVE AMERICAN ESTATE: THE STRUGGLE
OVER INDIAN AND HAWAIIAN LANDS 8-10 (1989). The Mahele of 1848 and the Kuleana
Act of 1850 legalized this concept of private fee simple land ownership, and, over a
short period of time, ultimately led to American citizens' ownership of vast quantities
of prime land in Hawaii. See KAME'ELEIHIWA, id. (describing the Mahele and its impact
upon Hawaiians and their relationship to the land); Marion Kelly, Land Tenure in
Hawaii, 7 AMERASIA J. 57 (1980) (describing the Mahele and Kuleana Act); Maivan
C. Lam, The Kuleana Act Revisited, 64 WASH. L. REV. 233 (1989) (describing the
Kuleana Act, in which fee title to land was to be distributed to commoners, and
arguing that despite long-term dispossession, traditional Hawaiian land rights remain
available to Hawaiians); Charles F. Wilkinson, Land Tenure in the Pacific: The Context
for Native Land Rights, 64 WASH. L. REV. 227 (1989); Neil M. Levy, Native Hawaiian
Land Rights, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 848 (1975). Most Hawaiian commoners, dispossessed
of land, were left with a badly damaged cultural-economic structure. The United
States-aided overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 and the annexation of
Hawaii as a territory in 1898 transferred Hawaiian government and crown lands to
the United States. The early 1900s found Hawaiians,. as a race, landless and devastated
by poverty, disease and social alienation. MACKENZIE, NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS
HANDBOOK, at 3-44. See also DAVID E. STANNARD, BEFORE THE HORROR: THE POPU-
LATION OF HAWAII ON THE EVE OF WESTERN CONTACT (1989) (discussing dramatic
decline in Hawaiian population through western contact); NOEL J. KENT, HAWAII:
ISLANDS UNDER THE INFLUENCE (1983); Haunani-Kay Trask, Coalition-Building Between
Natives and Non-Natives, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 1197, 1198-1205 (1991).
11 See infra Part II.
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headline in the late 1980s. Continuing disenfranchisement of Native
Hawaiians in their homeland and long-standing federal and state
governmental misuse of Hawaiian trust lands fueled Native Hawaiian
movements aimed at long-term cultural resurrection and political self-
determination.24 Access to courts for redress of governmental land trust
breaches became a focal point of Native Hawaiian strategies.
This article addresses ways in which legal process is transforming
Native Hawaiian land trust controversies and the cultural messages
underlying them. Theoretically, it frames the discussion in terms of
courts' "cultural performances" in rephrasing rights and in construct-
ing socio-legal narratives about a group's situation and relationships
with others. 5 Doctrinally, it frames the discussion in terms of proce-
dural obstacles to Native Hawaiians' right to sue.
New procedural obstacles have been erected in recent years; others
fortified; still others dismantled. After fits and starts, ambiguity and
inconsistency, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals now recognizes
federal jurisdiction over Native Hawaiian breach of land trust claims
cast as civil rights claims and recognizes Native Hawaiian standing to
assert those claims. The court also, however, has constructed formidable
civil rights immunity barriers and other procedural hurdles which
preclude, in most instances, maintenance and development of claims
for structural relief.26 It has thus translated volatile, deeply-rooted
cultural and political indigenous land trust controversies into civil rights
issues and then largely stripped those issues of cultural and political
content through the limiting language of legal process. Hawai'i's federal
district courts, in entertaining these controversies, are wrestling with
appellate procedural mandates. 27
From one perspective, the federal courts appear to be struggling
with process doctrines and procedural rules that are applied ordinarily
in more traditional civil rights litigation settings. From another per-
spective, the federal courts, for a variety of possible reasons, appear
to be ceding substantial power over Native Hawaiian land trust con-
troversies to state courts.2 8
21 See infra note 32 for a description of the Native Hawaiian land trusts.
21 See infra Part II.
26 See infra Part III. The term "structural relief" here means judicial remedies that
compel state officials to make decisions or alter decisions in ways that directly impact
upon the management or use of Hawaiian trust lands, as distinguished from purely
compensatory damage remedies.
27 See infra Part III.
28 Id.
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The approach of Hawai'i state courts is mixed. In 1982 the Hawai'i
Supreme Court broadly and clearly defined the nature and scope of
the state's Hawaiian Homelands trust obligations. 29 It did not, however,
accord Native Hawaiians access to state courts to enforce those obli-
gations. The state legislature's 1988 Native Hawaiian Trusts Judicial
Relief Act opened only the slimmest crack to the courthouse door."
In 1992, the Hawai'i Supreme Court, without additional legislation,
appeared to swing that door wide open. Pele Defense Fund v. Paty,3 in
important respects, is a landmark decision. In a finely-crafted, visionary
section of its Pele opinion, the court recognized Native Hawaiian land
trust beneficiaries' implied right to bring breach of trust actions against
the State in state court. It located that court access right under the
provisions of the Hawai'i Constitution establishing the Homelands and
Ceded Lands trusts.3 2 Recognizing the restrictiveness of federal law,
2' Ahuna v. Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, 64 Haw. 327, 640 P.2d 1161
(1982).
30 See infra Part V.
" 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1277 (1993).
32 Congress in 1920 passed the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. The Act set
aside in trust almost 200,000 acres of "government-owned" land that had been ceded
to the United States upon annexation of Hawai'i as a territory. The Act's purpose
was to "rehabilitate" the Hawaiian people and their culture by returning Hawaiians
to the land. "[Niative Hawaiians," defined by the Act to mean people of at least fifty
percent Hawaiian blood, became eligible to lease homestead lots for 99 years at $1.00
a year for residential, pastoral, and agricultural purposes. Hawaiian Homes Commis-
sion Act of 1920 (Pub. L. No. 67-34, ch. 42 §§ 207(a), 208(2), 42 Stat. 108 (1921)
("HHCA"). The United States served as the Homelands trustee until it transferred
responsibility for Homelands to the State of Hawai'i upon statehood. Hawai'i became
a state in 1959 when Congress passed the Hawai'i Admissions Act. The Admissions
Act constituted a compact between the United States and the newly created State. As
part of that compact, the State covenanted to accept title to and trust responsibility
over the Hawaiian Homelands. The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands ("DHHL"),
guided by the Hawaiian Homes Commission, is responsible for administration of the
Act - that is, for managing and using trust assets to place native Hawaiians on trust
lands. HHCA § 202. The Act permits the DHHL to lease "surplus" lands to the
public generally, by way of general leases. HHCA § 204(2). See generally MACKENZIE,
supra note 22, at 49-50. See also FEDERAL-STATE TASK FORCE ON THE HAWAIIAN HOMES
COMMISSION ACT, REPORT TO THE U.S. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR (1983).
In the Admissions Act compact, the State also assumed title to and trust respon-
sibility over nearly two million acres of Ceded Lands. Ceded Lands are lands formerly
belonging to the Hawaiian government and monarch which, upon annexation of
Hawai'i as a United States territory in 1898, were "ceded" to the United States.
Admission Act of 1959, Pub L. No. 86-3 §§ 5, 73 Stat. 4 (1959). Specifically, S 5(f)
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the Court declared that it would not leave Native Hawaiians "without
the [state law] means to hold" the State to its "fiduciary duties and
obligations as trustee.'"'" Apparently concerned about the absence of a
clear constitutional or statutory waiver of the State's sovereign im-
munity, however, the Pele court also transposed onto state court process
federal Eleventh Amendment immunity principles and appeared to
construe those principles restrictively. It thereby sharply limited the
number and type of eligible state court breach of trust claims, creating
uncertainty about court access. 34
For these general reasons, developed later, this article is titled in
part "Native Hawaiians' Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to
Sue." Native Hawaiian claimants must warily plan their approach to
courthouse entry. The article addresses salient procedural dimensions
to the assertion of Native Hawaiian land claims and the manner in
which legal process handles and, in important instances, transforms
those claims and their underlying cultural messages. It focuses on
Hawaiian Homelands and Ceded Lands breach of trust claims. 5 Other
of the Admissions Act provided that the Ceded Lands, and any income and proceeds
therefrom must be used for (1) the support of the public schools and other public
educational institutions; (2) the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians, as
defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920; (3) the development of farm
and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible; (4) the making of public
improvements; and (5) the provision of lands for public use. Until the State Consti-
tutional Convention of 1978, the State as Ceded Lands trustee construed § 5(f) to
mean that proceeds and income from the trust could be expended to serve any one
of those five purposes. In fact, the State chose to expend all Ceded Lands proceeds
and income on public education and nothing directly for the betterment of conditions
for Hawaiian people. The State's 1978 Constitutional Convention addressed the
Admissions Act's express trust provision concerning Hawaiian people. It added three
new sections to the Constitution. The first explicitly named two categories of trust
beneficiaries of the Ceded Lands trust-Hawaiians (defined as any person with
Hawaiian blood) and the general public. HAW. CONST., art. XII, S 4. The second
section created the Office of Hawaiian Affairs which became the state agency primarily
responsible to Hawaiians as beneficiaries of the Ceded Lands trust. Id. § 5. The third
section mandated, among other things, that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs receive
and administer in trust a pro rata share (twenty percent) of all income from the sale
or use of Ceded Lands. Id. § 6. See also 1980 HAW. SEss. LAws 273, codified at HAW.
REv. STAT. 5 10-13.5 (1985).
3 Pele, 73 Haw. at 601, 837 P.2d at 1261-62.
" See infra Part IVB.
" Both the Hawaiian Homelands Trust and the Ceded Lands Trust were created
in response to the serious consequences visited upon Hawaiians and their culture by
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types of Native Hawaiian claims are important. Homelands and Ceded
Lands breach of trust claims nevertheless provide an appropriate focal
point because they reflect a coalescence of Native Hawaiian ancestry,
culture and politics and because they embody an essential aspect of
expressed Native Hawaiian concerns-control over Native Hawaiian
lands .3 6
the imposition of Western culture and law. See supra note 32.
To date, only 38,000 acres of the nearly 200,000 acres set aside by the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act have been leased to Native Hawaiians. This comprises less
than twenty percent of the "available" lands. FEDERAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE
HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION ACT, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF HAWAII, Appendix 15 (August
1983). Much of the available land is currently unsuitable for homesteading purposes.
Several Homelands areas are arid, covered by lava, or of poor soil quality. Much of
the land that is inhabitable lacks infrastructure - roads, water delivery systems and
the like. By one estimate, 20,000 eligible Hawaiians remain on a Homelands waiting
list while many non-beneficiaries hold Homelands leases for a variety of private and
public uses. See MACKENZIE, supra note 22, at 51-52. For example, 295 acres of trust
land at Pohakuloa, Hawai'i is currently used by the United States Army for training
exercises. The Navy continues to occupy 25 acres of trust land in Kekaha on the
island of Kaua'i for storage purposes. Each paid $1.00 for 65 year leases. HAWAII
ADVISORY COMMITTEE To THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A
BROKEN TRUST, REPORT OF THE HAWAII ADVISORY COMMITTEE To THE UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 19 ("A BROKEN TRUST")(citing DEPARTMENT
OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, ANNUAL REPORT, 38 (1989)) (1991). See generally GEORGE
COOPER & GAVAN DAWS, LAND AND POWER IN HAWAII (1985); ELEANOR C. NORDYKE,
THE PEOPLING OF HAWAII, 134-72, 256-57 (2d ed. 1989).
On the island of Hawai'i, Parker Ranch, the country's second largest private
ranching enterprise, leases 27,000 acres of Homelands at $3.33 an acre while eligible
Hawaiians who desire ranch lots have waited sometimes decades for a homestead
award. Susan C. Faludi, Broken Promise: How Everyone Got Hawaiians' Homelands Except
the Hawaiians, WALL ST. J., Sept 9, 1991, at A-2. A former trustee of a major private
land trust, and non-beneficiary, reportedly lived on a 9,370 acre ranch situated on
Homelands. Id. at A-4. Other non-beneficiaries have profited from Homelands general
leases while sometimes paying less than $6 per acre per year. Id. Meanwhile, nearly
200 beneficiaries on the island of Hawai'i already awarded lots have been unable to
move onto them due to lack of infrastructure improvements. Id. In December 1985,
State officials traded nearly 28,000 acres of ceded lands in Puna on the island of
Hawai'i, for 26,000 acres of private Campbell Estate land covered by lava. The trade
was made to facilitate the State's development of a geothermal plant. MACKENZIE,
supra note 22, at 38-39. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the suit by Native
Hawaiians to invalidate the exchange. These situations provide foundational sources
for many Native Hawaiian breach of land trust claims.
36 For many Native Hawaiians, the return of and control over Native Hawaiian
trust lands is essential to Native Hawaiian self-determination. See generally Haunani-
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II. COURTS AND THE CULTURAL PERFORMANCE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES'
CLAIMS IN AMERICA'S POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA
A. The International Setting
For this article we rely upon the historical accounts of other articles
Kay Trask, The Birth of the Modern Hawaiian Movement: Kalama Valley, Oahu, 21 HAW.
J. HIST. 126 (1987). Native Hawaiian movements to gain control over trust lands
have ancestral, cultural and political-structural dimensions. These dimensions presently
coalesce in constructing Native Hawaiians as a race. See generally MICHAEL OMI &
HOWARD WIGANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 66-69 (1986) (describing
racial formation and the creation of racial meanings); Ian Haney Lopez, The Social
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) (describing the coalescence of ancestry, social-historical context
and self-identification in the social construction of a racial group). Claims under federal
and state law are ancestrally categorized. Statutorily-recognized beneficiaries of the
Homelands trust are people with at least fifty percent Hawaiian blood. See supra notes
21 and 32. This statutory blood quantum construction of Hawaiianness draws arbitrary
and highly divisive lines, irrespective of culture or identity. It separates "native
Hawaiians" eligible for trust lands (fifty percent blood or more) from ineligible
"Hawaiians" (less than fifty percent). Ancestral or blood categorizing also frames the
discourse about "special" governmental treatment of Homelands beneficiaries vis-a-
vis other groups. The Prologue briefly recounts the former Honolulu mayor's reported
legal stance on property tax exemptions for Hawaiian Homesteaders. The Homelands
program, which Congress created in partial response to the United States-aided illegal
overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian nation, is now viewed by powerful actors such
as the former mayor as a "racial preference" that violates the civil rights of other
racial groups. See infra note 104 (United States Justice Department's position that
special funding for Native Hawaiians is an illegal racial preference.)
The struggle for control over trust lands also has a cultural dimension. For some,
the continuing spiritual and cultural harm Native Hawaiians suffered from their
separation from the land, see supra, can only be repaired through the creation of a
land base for Native Hawaiians to foster the rejuvenation of essential aspects of
Hawaiian culture. The struggle also has a political-structural dimension. For many
Native Hawaiians, some form of self-governance is the best response to the continuing
effects of colonial conquest. Without land, there can be no economic base. Without
an economic base, there can be no self-governance. Recognition of rights of self-
governance without land is practically meaningless. See ROBERT BLAUNER, RACIAL
OPPRESSION IN AMERICA (1972) (linking land reclamation and resistance to cultural
domination in theory of internal colonialism); OMI AND WICANT, supra, at 49, 161
(critiquing the application of internal colonialism theory). In these ways, current Native
Hawaiian breach of land trust claims, undergirded by political self-governance move-
ments, reflect the social construction of Native Hawaiians as a race, coalescing
ancestral, cultural and political-structural concerns.
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and law reviews for specific descriptions of Hawai'i's social-political
setting and current movements toward Native Hawaiian sovereignty
and for general descriptions of Native American law and self-deter-
mination efforts.3 7 Dramatic and sometimes explosive social structural
changes throughout the world provide the broader context. Those
changes warrant brief discussion as part of the framework for focused
inquiry on federal and state courts and Hawaiian lands claims.
Internationally, two seemingly contradictory geo-political trends have
emerged-unification and separatism. Some situations reflect separa-
tism within unification. East and West Germany merged, with some-
times violent repercussions against "outsiders" within Germany's
borders.3 8 The multi-country European Community lurches toward a
unified economic system in the face of increasing resistance linked in
part to complex political and cultural diversity. Other situations reflect
separatist movements as responses to the oppression of indigenous or
minority groups. The Palestinian self-determination movement matured
into an agreement with Israel over control over the Left Bank and
Gaza Strip. The Soviet Union splintered into separate republics follow-
ing the dissolution of the "unifying" communist party. Individual
republics, such as Georgia, themselves face secessionist movements by
ethnic minorities. The former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in Cen-
tral Europe, Spain in Western Europe, Canada in North America, and
Ethiopia in Africa, among other countries, are experiencing intensifying
separatist challenges to dominant powers.3 9
" See Leslie K. Friedman, Native Hawaiians, Self-Determination, And The Inadequacy Of
The State Land Trusts, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 519 (1992); Mia Y. Teruya, The Native
Hawaiian Trust Judicial Relief Act, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 889 (1992); Williamson B. C.
Chang, Reversals of Fortune: The Hawaii Supreme Court, the Memorandum Decision, And The
Realignment Of Political Power in Post-State-Hood Hawaii, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 17 (1992);
Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, The Lum Court And Native Hawaiian Rights, 14 U.
HAW. L. REV. 377 (1992); Hawaii's Ceded Lands, 3 U. HAW. L. REV. 101 (1981). See
also Haunani-Kay Trask, COALITION-BUILDING, supra note 22. See supra notes 9, 16 and
18, and infra notes 44, 46, 50, 55, 59-60 and 64 for discussions of Native Americans
and legal process.
31 Germans' Bitterly Divided About Unification, HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN, October 1,
1993, at A-11.
19 See generally HURST HANNUM, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE Ac-
COMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1990) (addressing problems and possibilities
of subgroup autonomy within nation-states); Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitari-
anism, And The Rights Of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615-16 (1991);
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The Pacific is experiencing similar movements. Integral to these
movements are formerly colonized indigenous peoples' demands, cast
in the language of rights, for political, economic and cultural self-
determination, and for reclamation of homeland territory. Indigenous
groups making such demands include the Native Hawaiians, or Kanaka"
Maoli, of Hawai'i, the Maoris of New Zealand, the Chamorros of
Guam and the aborigines of Australia.' For these and other indigenous
groups, 1993 marked the "Year of Indigenous Peoples Rights.' '41 The
United Nations Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities is investigating the impact of countries' laws
Rosen, supra note 11.
Olara Otunnu, director of the International Peace Academy, observes two strains
of separatism, or self-determination, challenges.
One is principally a European phenomenon. There we are witnessing a resur-
gence of claims for self-determination in their classical form: Peoples demanding
their own nation-state, their own territory, their own government. This is the
kind of self-determination that colonial peoples claimed in the 1950s and
1960s.***In other parts of the world-especially Africa-I see demands not for
classical self-determination but for what one might call a second generation of
self-determination. Despite appearances, most of those troubles are not about
redrawing boundaries. They are about having political participation, about being
given economic opportunities, about being given space for expression of identity:
in other words, they are about people seeking to have a better deal within
existing boundaries. These two kinds of situations require different strategies.
Joshua Cohen, An Interview with Ambassador Olara Otunnu, BOSTON REVIEW, Vol. XVIII
(June 1993).
'" See DONNA AWATERE, N(AORI SOVEREIGNTY (1984); Stewart Firth, Sovereignty And
Independence In The Contemporary Pacific, I CONTEMP. PAC. 75 (1989); Haunani-Kay
Trask, Politics In The Pacific Islands: Imperialism And Native Self-determination, 16 AMERASIA
J. 1 (1990). For a general description of the Australian Aboriginal people's movement,
see Aborigines Strive to Find Rightful Place, HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN, June 16, 1992, at
A-6; Blunders Depict Aborigine Struggle, HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN, June 16, 1992, at A-
6. Significantly, these movements tend to be politically' rather than legally driven.
International law norms address "rights" to self-determination and independence. See
S. James Anaya, A Contemporary Definition Of The International Norm Of Self-determination,
3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (1993); Lea Brillmayer, Secession And Self-
determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT. L. 177 (1991); the United
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples' draft "Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples," U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/CRP.4 (1993). No court, how-
ever, has universally accepted jurisdiction to recognize and enforce those politically
volatile rights.
4' The United Nations General Assembly designated 1992-1993 as the "Year of
Indigenous People's Rights." HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER:
COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'i 41 (1993).
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on particular indigenous groups, including Native Hawaiians. 42 The
United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, starting with
the foundational principle of self-determination, is finalizing its pro-
posed "Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples." '4 3 Cast as
42 Those groups include Native Hawaiians, aboriginal Australians, the Gitksan,
Wet'suwet'en and Lubicon Cree tribes of Canada, the Yanomami tribe of Brazil,
various Guatemalan tribes, the San or Bushmen tribe of Southern Africa and the
Ainu of Japan. U.N. Group Will Do Study on Hawaiians, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, August
5, 1993, A-3. See also, U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIG-
ENOUS POPULATIONS, Vol. V, U.N. Doc. G/CN. 4/Sub. 2 (1986).
41 Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29.
International law may provide protection to Native Hawaiians in a general sense and,
more specifically, as an indigenous people through the norms of decolonization and
self-determination. Article 1 of the United Nations Charter provides that there shall
be "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples." U. N. CHARTER, art. 1. Article 73 of the United
Nations Charter specifies a process through which non-self-governing territories, which
Hawai'i was officially prior to 1959, may determine their future political status. Article
73 also mandates that states having jurisdiction over non-self-governing territories have
a "sacred trust . . . to develop self-government, to take due account of the political
aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their
free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory
and its people and their varying stages of development." U.N. CHARTER, art. 73.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also give
recognition to the right to self-determination. Article 1 of both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, which is not yet ratified by the U.S. Senate, declares
that, "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), ratified by the United States on Sept. 8,
1992; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); see generally
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Pan American Union, Final
Act of the Ninth Conference of American States 38-45 (1948); American Convention
on Human Rights, in force July 18, 1978, signed by United States June 1, 1977.
Self-determination as a legal norm is thus recognized in the international agreements
cited above. International agreements that lack the status of treaties may nevertheless
be binding on the courts of the United States through the Supremacy Clause, Article
VI of the United States Constitution. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, S 111(1) (1987); see also, United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)(courts may determine the status of the international
common law by "consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law;
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rights, some indigenous peoples' political, cultural and homelands
demands are receiving legislative attention and some are emerging in
national and local courts.
B. Court Process and Cultural Performance in Post-Civil Rights America
As Gerald Torres observes, "[w]ithin a society, there are specific
places where most of the activities making up social life within that
society simultaneously are represented, contested, and inverted. Courts
are such places." ' 44 This observation is reinforced by the studies of
socio-legal scholars which conclude that case handling by courts can
be viewed as "cultural performances, events that produce transfor-
mations in socio-cultural practices and in consciousness. "'4 Especially
where rights are asserted, those transformations may tend to be re-
or by the general usage or practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing
and enforcing that law") (citations omitted).
Because of the "international consensus" concerning basic human rights, "inter-
national law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their governments,"
subject to further "refinement and elaboration." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 883-84, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The courts of the United States thus have grounds
for considering international norms of decolonization and self-governance in assessing
Native Hawaiians' claims of self-determination. See also TRASK, COLONIALISM AND
SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I, supra note 41 at 40-47 (describing the "growing perception
that indigenous peoples should occupy a different [legal] status", and the draft
Declaration codifying indigenous peoples' rights. Id. at 41).
Gerald Torres, Translating Yonnondio: By Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian
Case, 1990 DUKE L. J. 625, 628. While we acknowledge the existence and importance
of tribal courts, our focus is on federal and state courts and their handling of indigenous
peoples' claims.
" Sally E. Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW AND SOCIETY REV. 889, 892 (1991).
Cultural and legal anthropologists in particular are developing theoretical insights into
courts in colonial and post-colonial settings as cultural performers. See ANTHONY
GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1993) (methods of dispute handling
can be viewed as embedded in cultural practices); JOHN COMAROFF AND SIMON ROBERTS,
RULES AND PROCESSES: THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF DISPUTES IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT
(1981); infra note 50 addressing the meaning of the term "cultural performance." See
generally JUNE STARR AND JANE COLLIER, HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1989) (conceiving of institutions as forms
of cultural expression illuminating the dynamics of struggle for change among elites
and others); John Conley, William O'Barr and E. Allen Lind, The Power Of Language:
Presentation Style In The Courtroom, 78 DUKE L. REV. 1375 (1978); Barbara Ygnvesson,
Making Law At The Doorway: The Clerk, The Court And The Construction Of Community In
A New England Town, 22 LAW & Soc. REV. 410 (1988); SALLY E. MERRY, GETTING
JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN (1990).
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pressive, legitimating harsh imbalances of power in existing social
relationships; they may tend to be liberatory, opposing or reconfiguring
entrenched group images and relationships; or they may reflect some
complex, shifting combination of the two. Those transformations may
occur as accretions over time, little noticed; or they may emerge in
the jolt of a singular case-event. Of course, relatively few court cases
singularly produce transformations in socio-cultural practices and in
consciousness. Those that do tend to occur when the legal dispute is
reflective of a larger on-going social-political controversy. Other fac-
tors-location, media attention, community organizing, related law-
suits, or legislative initiatives-are significant.
46
A classic example of a federal court's cultural performance involving Native
Americans is described by James Clifford in his account of the Mashapee Indians land
claims. JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETH-
NOGRAPHY, CULTURE AND ART (1988). The Mashapee Indians filed suit under a federal
statute to reclaim valuable lands their ancestors once possessed. The court transformed
the contemporary political-legal land dispute with deep historical roots into an issue
of standing-finding that according to distinctly western definitions the Mashapee
Indians did not constitute a "tribe" and therefore accrued no right to sue. See also
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1991) (describing the court's con-
struction of Mashapee identity); Torres, supra note 44 (describing the way the court's
performance inverted the Mashapee Indians claims and view of themselves). See generally
ARNOLD KRUPAT, ETHNO-CRITICISMS: ETHNOGRAPHY, HISTORY AND LITERATURE (1992)
(examining early Native American federal court cases and the submerged voices of
Native American leaders).
Recent notable examples of courts' cultural performances include the initial Rodney
King police brutality trial in California state court in Simi Valley. Court process and
trial, including the venue and peremptory juror challenges, portrayed a largely white,
middle class jury and the legal system as uncomprehending of the milieu surrounding
Rodney King's beating. The Mabo II ruling of the Australian High Court jettisoned
the doctrine of terra nullius and recognized historical-cultural bases for native land tide,
fostering far-reaching political and legal responses. See supra note 11. See also Peter Kar
Yu Kwon, Facts & Fiction, Narratives & Myths (manuscript on file with authors)
(discussing High Court of Australia's decision in Mabo v. Queensland). Other recent
examples particular to Hawaii include the Marcos class action civil trial against Imelda
Marcos and others in the Hawaii federal district court on grounds of torture and
murder of political dissidents in the Philippines; the State v. Ganal murder prosecution
in state court in which the Filipino male defendant asserted a "amok" cultural defense
to the murder and attempted murder of his spouse, children, parents and others. See
Belinda A. Aquino, A Filipino Tragedy In Hawaii (unpublished manuscript on file
with authors); the Ka'ai'ai v. Drake class action litigation in state court to compel
appointment of an independent representative of Hawaiian Homelands Trust benefi-
ciaries to participate in Department of Hawaiian Homelands negotiations against the
State for past misuse of Homelands. See infra notes 278-79,
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The view of courts as dynamic sites of cultural performances is
supported generally by dispute transformation theory. According to
this theory, each stage of the court process in varying ways contributes
to a "rephrasing" of the dispute. 47 Decisions concerning initial claim
assertion followed by decisions concerning pretrial discovery, sanctions
and overall case management (including motions and settlement ma-
neuvering and legal issue formulation) redefine the claimant's under-
standing and framing of the controversy. The interactions among
parties, attorneys, judge, court personnel, community groups and
general public, through the media, and the trial itself, further contribute
to this rephrasing at the trial court level. Decisions by appellate courts,
more detached and, yet in some respects, more far-reaching, further
solidify the court system's dispute rephrasing performance. As Profes-
sors Mather and Ygnvesson observe, a legally phrased claim is a
''social construct which orders 'facts' and invokes 'norms' in particular
ways-ways that reflect the personal interests and values" of the
describer. 48 Concerns critical to the rephrasing process thus arise: Who
has court access; who controls claim development and presentation;
according to what standards; from what perspectives; who reports on
the contextual facts; and according to what selection criteria? What
Drawing upon anthropology, sociology, critical theory, among other disciplines,
socio-legal scholars have identified dispute transformation as an integral part of legal
process. The transformation of disputes is described, in part, in terms of a contextual
"rephrasing" of disputes. See William Felstiner, Richard Abel & Austin Sarat, The
Emergence And Transformation Of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming. ... 15 LAW &
Soc. REV. 631 (1980-81) (foundational socio-legal research into the ways in which
disputes are transformed as they are processed through a legal system); Lynn Mather
and Barbara Ygnvesson, Language, Audience and The Transformation of Disputes, 15 LAW
& Soc. REV. 775, 780 (1980-81) (describing legal claims as social constructs). See also
Bryant Garth, Power And Legal Artifice: The Federal Class Action, 26 LAW & Soc. REV.
237, 240 (1992) ("the process of moving from a social relationship of conflict to a
lawsuit inevitably entails a translation into legal language. . .. The dispute [also]
changes form, expands or contracts or changes in focus in response to numerous
contextual factors" Id. at 240.); Starr and Collier, supra note 45.
James Boyd White provides an insightful temporal view of textual "translation"
in legal process that enriches socio-legal research conclusions. He observes that the
legal text, or the formally written right, "remains the same, but its translation-its
being carried over-to our own time locates it in a new context of particularities which
will, and should, give it a transformed meaning." JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE As
TRANSLATION, XIII (1990).
0 Mather & Ygnvesson, supra note 47, at 780. See also Judith Resnik, On The Bias:
Feminist Reconsiderations of The Aspirations For Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877
(1988).
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cultural values collide and emerge in the interactions of judges, parties,
attorn'eys, communities and media? 49 These concerns shape the contours
and content of a court system's overall cultural performance. 0 From
this view, courts in important instances not only decide disputes, they
41 See Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights And Politics: Perspectives From The
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986) (describing ways in which legal
theory can inform the interactions of litigants, attorneys, judge, community groups
and media and in turn be re-formed by that interaction to further social-political
movements).
- Differing communities, of course, will view the same performance differently.
Audiences vary in time, space and composition. A particular performance will thus
be viewed and interpreted by multiple, overlapping communities, and will generate
multiple, varying messages. See JAMES SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF REsIs-
TANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (1990) (examining narratives of those of differing positions
on the social hierarchy and identifying differing constructed meanings of events viewed
in the "theatre of power"). In this sense, interpretive communities will be interactively
constructing meaning not so much concerning legal texts as concerning legal events.
Those events, or performances, will comprise a complex array of legal and non-legal
texts, media images, word of mouth stories, and flesh and blood people, among other
things. See generally Jo Carrillo, The American Indian And The Problem Of History
(Book Review), 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 281 (1991) (observing that "every telling of a story,
whether it be a general story or a self-referential story, is subject to change, to memory,
to interpretation. And every single voice may, in effect, be a compilation of many
voices, past and present." Id. at 283).
Our use of the term "performance" here is modified by the term "cultural." In
using the term cultural we mean something more specific than the collective practices
and values of mainstream American society. We also mean something particularized
to groupings of people (whether those groups are circumscribed by race, ethnicity,
language, gender, geography, history or other similar factors), but something still less
tangible than the customs, religious practices and relational forms of those particular
groups. We draw upon anthropological approaches. By "culture" we mean a given
community's system of constructed or "inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic
forms by means of which [people] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowl-
edge about attitudes toward life." CLIFFORD GERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES,
at 89 (1973). For Renato Rosaldo, those forms provide structure "through which
people make sense of their lives." RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE
REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS, at 26 (1989). Although in crucial respects multi-
dimensional, shifting and regenerating, a group member's culture "provides the
framework, the anchor, within which a range of choices and values can be considered
and evaluated." Adeno Addis, supra note 39, at 658.
Thus a "cultural performance," and more specifically "a court's cultural perform-
ance," as we use the term, addresses a performance (actions, interactions) that in
some fashion impacts upon the ways in which often differing communities construct
their frameworks, however shifting and regenerating, "within which a range of choices
and values [about the subject or event portrayed] can be considered and evaluated."
Id.
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also transform particular legal controversies and rights claims into
larger public messages.
Those messages can be thought of as socio-legal or cultural narratives,
or stories, about groups, institutions, situations and relationships.51 The
shaping and then retelling of stories through court process can help
either to reinforce or counter a prevailing cultural narrative in a given
community. A prevailing, or master, narrative provides a principal
lense through which groupings of people in a community see and
interpret events and actions.5 2 It provides a set of basic assumptions
51 SeeJEAN-FP.ANcOIs LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWL-
EDGE (1984) (describing the functioning of societal "grand narratives"); Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing The Call Of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991) (critiquing the use
of narratives in legal scholarship as means for raising silenced voices and challenging
the notion of objectivity in decisional process). The term "narrative" varies in meaning
and usage. Briefly stated, Lyotard's "narrative" refers to words or images that reflect
a collective understanding of a situation, relationship, or event. Those words or images
construct for their holders a lense through which other social situations, relationships,
or events are viewed and interpreted. Abrams' "narrative" refers to the use of
storytelling by legal scholars as a means for comprehending legal rules and processes,
for identifying vantage points and power relations, for raising voices silenced by those
rules and processes and for offering normative foundations for remaking the socially
oppressive dimensions of law. Lyotard's and Abram's usages are connected. Scholars
writing about law's oppression of minorities, for example, have embraced legal story-
telling in part to construct oppositionist lenses (or larger counter-narratives) for
destablizing and altering dominant social narratives. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling
For Oppositionists And Others: A Plea For Narrative, 87 MICH L. REV. .2411 (1989)
(Storytelling For Oppositionists). Narrative in legal scholarship has been the subject of
sharp debate. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An
Essay On Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (criticizing the use of narratives
by feminist and critical race scholars without evidence of the existence of different
voices); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories In School: A Reply To Farber And Sherry, 46
VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993) (responding). The term "cultural narrative," as we use it,
is similar to the term "social or societal narrative." We use "cultural," as defined
infra note 50, to emphasize the context in which these narratives are produced,
enhanced, contested and transformed-indigenous peoples' land claims in American
courts.
" See Lyotard, supra note 51; Richard Delgado, Storytelling For Oppositionists, supra
note 51. Addressing perceptual mechanisms for "understanding others," historian
Greg Dening uses the term "model" to describe what are in essence grand narratives-
prevailing language and imagery that translate perceptions and experiences of others
into dominant cultural understandings, whether or not those understandings reflect
the perceptions and experiences of those "others." Dening uses the term "metaphor"
to describe what are in essence counter-narratives-' 'entry into the experience of
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for evaluating social-political controversies and the relationships of the
groups involved.
A: counter-narrative challenges those assumptions and the vantage
point from which they are made. By offering a "framework not
previously accepted," the counter-narrative challenges "established cat-
egories for classifying events and relationships by linking subjects or
issues that are typically separated" or by elevating previously sup-
pressed voices, thus "stretching or changing accepted frameworks for
organizing reality." 5 3 It thereby undermines the clarity and strength
of the master narrative, infusing complexity and providing a competing
perspective .54
others" through language and imagery to enlarge cultural understandings.
Understanding others, then, can have two meanings. It can mean entry into
the experience of others in such a way that we share the metaphors that enlarge
their experience. Or it can mean that we translate that experience into a model
that has no actuality in the consciousness of those being observed but becomes
the currency of communication amongst the observers... [Mlodels are schizoid:
they belong to two systems, the one they describe and the one that constructs
them.
GREG DENING, ISLANDS AND BEACHES, at 93 (1980).
11 Mather & Yngvesson, supra note 47, at 778-79. Mather and Yngvesson describe
the concept of "expansion" in dispute transformation theory in terms that are generally
applicable to the discussion of master and counter-narratives. Richard Delgado observes
that oppositionist stories in a legal forum can create space for "expansion" by helping
to develop counter-narratives that are "powerful means for destroying mindset - the
bundle of presuppositions, received wisdom, and shared understanding against a
background in which legal and political discourse takes place." Delgado, Storytelling
For Oppositionists, supra note 51, at 2413.
51 See RICHARD DELGADO, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN
STORYTELLING AND THE LAW, at 289 (David Ray Papke ed. 1991):
For stories create their own bonds, represent cohesion, shared understandings,
and meanings. The cohesiveness that stories bring is part of the strength of the
outgroup. An outgroup creates its own stories, which circulate within the group
as a kind of counter-reality.
Id. at 289.
The dominant group creates its own stories, as well. The stories or narratives
told by the ingroup remind it of its identity in relation to outgroups, and provide
it with a form of shared reality in which its own superior position is seen as
natural.
Id.; see also Newton, Indian Claims, supra note 18, at 760 (describing Euromyths and
counter-narratives by Native Americans in legal process); Scott, supra note 50 (describ-
ing hidden transcripts of Native American resistance). See generally GERALD LOZEZ,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING 39-44 (1992) (describing legal storytelling by lay people and
lawyers as a method for challenging subordinating narratives).
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Historically, for example, master socio-legal narratives about indig-
enous groups have tended to characterize their subordinated situations
as inevitable, due to the groups' inferiority, or insignificant, due to
the passage of time and past remedial efforts. Nell Jessup Newton
observes in the context of Native American legal claims that, "[t]he
Euromyths of the dominant group . . . justify and rationalize the
dispossession of Native Americans from their lands and blame them
for continuing to refuse the full benefits of membership in the dominant
culture."" Similarly, subordinating socio-legal narratives concerning
Native Hawaiians have long fixed blame for their physical and cultural
destruction on Native Hawaiians' inferiority and "semi-barbarous
face.'' 56 The Congressional Record of the annexation debates following
the overthrow of the Hawaiian government provides insight into how
these narratives were embodied in and reproduced by law - or, as
one United States Senator put it, the "legalization of the great destiny
for Hawai'i."' '5
Side by side on their islands were two civilizations, fiigher and a lower
civilization. On the side of the higher civilization were ranged the
intelligence, the progress, the thrift, the aspirations for enlarged liberty
11 Newton, Indian Claims, supra note 18 at 760-761. See also Robert A. Williams,
Jr. Encounters On The Frontiers Of International Human Rights Law: Redefining The Terms
Of Indigenous Peoples' Survival In The World, 1990 DUKE L. J. 660 (describing how
earlier international law norms, particularly the doctrine of discovery, and the narratives
engendered by those norms operated to destroy, or at least subordinate, American
Indians); S. James Anaya, The Rights Of Indigenous Peoples And International Law In
Historical And Contemporary Perspective, 1989 HARV. INDIAN L. SyMp. 191 (1990). See
generally CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW (1986).
For Native Hawaiians, the question arises, what groups, or interests, have generated
and continue to generate dominant societal narratives about Native Hawaiians? A
response to that question requires a complex, social-historical account of Hawai'i inter-
group relations that is beyond the scope of this article. That account would trace the
socio-political shift from the Hawaiian monarchy of the mid 1880s, to the white
American oligopoly that controlled Hawai'i economics and politics from the late 1880s
through the early 1950s, to Pearl Harbor and the United States military, to the
"democratic revolution" of the mid 1950s, engineered by labor and a coalition of
ethnic groups, to statehood in 1959 and a booming economy and rapidly expanding
state government and an emergent middle class of predominantly Japanese, Chinese
and Caucasian Americans, to the present. See generally KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 22;
LAWRENCE FUCHS, HAWAII PONO (1970).
53 CONG. REc. 1885 (1894) (recording a statement by United States Senator
Johnson from Indiana in which he argues for annexation of Hawaii as a territory of
the United States).
57 Id.
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and for the legalization of a great destiny for Hawai'i. On the other
side was ranged the monarchy, with its narrow, contracted view of
human rights, with its semibarbarous face turned toward the past,
unwilling to greet the dawning sun... From the very nature of things
these two civilizations could not exist together forever. One was to
survive and the other would have to perish.
58
Court rulings have reinforced such master narratives, and harsh
societal actions have been justified by them. 9 Many indigenous groups,
Id. See WILLIAMS, DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST, supra note 9 (discussing the doctrine
of discovery and the master narrative concerning uncivilized Indians that justified
confiscation of lands).
Where, for example, cultural-legal controversies about an indigenous group's home-
land "rights" are channeled into the legal process and then disposed of consistently
on procedural grounds without full story development (discovery), performance (trial)
or elaboration (appellate review), a collective story is narrowly shaped and told. The
story is that the group not only lacks homeland rights worthy of full institutional
consideration; the story is also that the "law" deems the group's own messages about
those controversies, its voice, insignificant. Several larger narratives might be supported
by these stories. One might be that the legal system is ill-suited for, or at least
uncomfortable with, deciding controversies of this type. Resort must be to the purely
political branches of state and federal government. Another, and from the group's
perspective, more invidious narrative might be subtly supported by these stories: The
past is past, and, given the judicially recognized insignificance of these claims, the
group's difficulties are probably linked to its own deficiencies and inability to lift itself
up by its bootstraps.
In contrast, where an indigenous group is accorded access to the judicial forum
and cultural-legal controversies are afforded full opportunity for development, airing
and review in the judicial forum, whether cast as traditional or non-traditional rights
claims, an indigenous group may look to the court process as part of its larger efforts
to tell its story with complexity and humanity. It may use the power of governmental
court process to help counter what it perceives to be an inaccurate, harmful prevailing
master narrative-to tell a story in a formal institutional setting, for example, that
counters the narratives described in the preceding paragraph; to offer a narrative about
past cultural destruction and present cultural and economic resurrection and the pivotal
role of homelands to actualizing the international human rights principle of self-
determination. From this view, described only briefly here, master narratives and
counter-narratives are lenses that shape societal perceptions of a group's actions and
situations. See supra notes 51-55. A court's cultural performances can contribute to
reinforcing prevailing narratives or to elevating countering ones. Those performances
sometimes aid in the transformation of indigenous peoples' disputes into public
messages, discounting or highlighting the perspective, and silencing or enhancing the
voice, of the group.
" See WILLIAMS, DIsCouRSES OF CONQUEST, supra note 9 (describing the Supreme
Court's acceptance of the European doctrine of discovery concerning rights to "dis-
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including Native Hawaiians, are now countering master cultural nar-
ratives with narratives of their own-not only telling stories of historical
and contemporary victimization but also offering normative precepts
for future social structural change. 60 These counter-narratives are rooted
in history and culture. 61 And they are rooted in law. 62
There is growing recognition of the power of legal storytelling in the
construction of counter-narratives in legal process. 63 Professor Newton
describes how "claims stories [by Native Americans], when broken
from the dry legal recitation of the facts in the cases and placed in
context, reveal powerfully the inadequacies of the dominant group's
stories."64 In this setting, indigenous groups are both asserting rights
covered" land and the way in which the doctrine legally erased the existence of
American Indians). See also Rennard Strickland, Genocide-At-Law: An Historic And
Contemporary View Of The Native American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REV. 713 (1986)
(describing legal mechanisms in the 18th and 19th centuries allowing United States
citizens to kill American Indians, appropriate their land and destroy tribal culture);
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents Of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy Of European
Racism And Colonialism In The Narrative Traditions Of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 237 (1989)
60 See supra note 6 discussing Kealoha v. Hee and its argument for resort to
international law to guide the state and federal governments in dispute resolution
proceedings involving Native Hawaiians; Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, And
Hard Work: An Essay On Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 411, 445
("International law not only provides legal insight into the struggle of indigenous
people for voice and recognition, but it also helps to illuminate the constraints on that
development which find their roots in certain foundational Indian law principles")
(emphasis original). See also Thorstenson v Cudmore, 18 I.L.R. 6051, 6053 (1991) (in
arguing the structural illegitimacy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs role in imposing
particular constitutions on tribes, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of Appeals
carefully detailed how "this [restrictive jurisdictional] oddity in the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribal [Constitution]. . .does not have its roots in any considered decision of
the Cheyenne River Sioux people, but rather in some gross B.I.A. oversight or self-
imposed legal concern to tread cautiously when potential non-Indian interests are
involved"); Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work, at 430 (describing
Thorstenson and the "intrusive role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the original
drafting and preparation of the tribal constitution").
61 See infra note 279.
'" See supra notes 18 and 279.
"3 See Charles Lawrence, III, The Word And The River: Pedagogy As Scholarship As
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 (1992); Jane Baron, The Many Promises Of Storytelling
In Law, 23 RUTGERS L. J. 79, 97 (1991) (describing litigators' use of story-telling
techniques).
Newton, Indian Claims, supra note 18, at 760. See also Frank Pommersheim, supra
note 60, at 429 ("Federal Indian law doctrines are grounded in 'stories' of conquest,
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claims within narrow and expansive frameworks and rethinking and
recasting the "cultural performance" role of federal and state courts.65
Rethinking and recasting the role of courts for indigenous groups,
described below, parallels shifting perceptions of the judicial role in
civil rights litigation. It reflects in part the transformation from the
civil rights activity of the mid-1960s to what some now call the "post-
civil rights" era. Some at one extreme maintain that civil rights
struggles are passe. They point to civil rights legislation of the 1960s
and 70s and a societal mandate against overt discrimination. 66 They
see the roots of current minorities' problems in preference programs,
failed victim-oriented economic policies and useless discrimination lit-
igation. 67 Some at the other extreme "trash" civil rights as safety
valves controlled by society's dominant interests to relieve momentary
pressure from those at the bottom, perpetuating status quo social-power
relationships. 68 For them, meaningful social structural change only
occurs through radical political action outside the prevailing legal
system. Others view civil rights litigation with great caution, taking
care not to misperceive judicial "rights" victories necessarily as har-
bingers of meaningful societal change, and yet viewing legal rights
claims as sometimes potent vehicles for outsider challenges to en-
cultural superiority, and a guardian/ward mentality. Tribal court narratives may seek
to unravel such stories that contain a 'mindset' justifying the world as it is with tribal
existence beholden to federal benevolence" Id. at 429).
65 See supra notes 6, 46, 47, 50 and infra note 279 and accompanying text.
Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (finding a "racially neutral" test
given to police officer applicants which measured verbal ability, vocabulary, and
reading comprehension rationally related to the Government's interest in upgrading
the communicative skills'of its employees. Id. at 245). The United States Supreme
Court had "difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral qualifi-
cation for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies 'any person
... equal protection of the laws' simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail
to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups." Id. at 245.
61 Thomas Sowell 139 (1984); Shelby Steele, The New Sovereignty, HARPERS MAGA-
ZINE, July 1992, pp. 47.; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE
( ) and THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1935).
6 Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 303-04 (1987) (summarizing certain Critical
Legal Studies views: "Rights legitimize society's unfair power arrangements, acting
like pressure valves to allow only so much injustice. With much fanfare, the powerful
periodically distribute rights as proof that the system is fair and just, and then quietly
deny rights through narrow construction, nonenforcement, or delay" (footnotes omit-
ted) Id. at 303-04).
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trenched authority in language that compels explanation and justifica-
tion-as oppositional cultural practices that can collectivize and express
the experiences and visions of outsider groups.69
At the risk of oversimplification, the current post-civil rights era in
America might thus be generally characterized by a reconceptualizing
of the role of rights litigation as part of, rather than as the pinnacle
of, political strategies for social structural change; the movement away
from principal reliance on narrow judicial remedies toward the addi-
tional use of courts as forums for the development and expression of
counter-narratives and for the promotion of local empowerment and
community control; and a rising importance of state or other local
legal forums for hearing outsiders' claims.70 The post-civil rights era
might also be characterized as reflecting a significant tension about
values of court process for indigenous peoples-recognizing that indig-
enous peoples' histories and claims to homelands often fall outside the
framework of accepted civil rights principles of non-discrimination and
diversity, and yet acknowledging that court challenges and rights claims
sometimes help focus issues, illuminate institutional power arrange-
ments, and tell counter-stories in ways that assist larger social-political
movements. 7
For indigenous peoples and established governments, "the times they
are a changing." 72 Federal and state courts in the post-civil rights era
are facing indigenous peoples' claims cast within dual frameworks. As
revealed by Sam Kealoha's challenge to OHA, described in the Pro-
logue, the evolving language of indigenous rights bespeaks both tra-
ditional legal claims and claims cast according to customary and
international rights norms.7" And state courts in particular may be, in
'9 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform And Retrenchment: Transformation And Legiti-
mation In Anti-discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 133 (1988).
70 Mari Matsuda, Looking To The Bottom: Critical Legal Studies And Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (describing "outsider" positioning in law).
1 See John Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, And Fire Music: Securing An
Authentic Intellectual Life In A Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992)
(describing a post-civil rights era).
72 BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a Changing, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED
(Warner Bros. Inc., 1964).
73 In 1993, the Hawaii State Legislature acknowledged the relevance of international
human rights norms in the preamble to legislation creating the Native Hawaiian
Sovereignty Advisory Commission.
The purpose of this Act is to acknowledge and recognize the unique status the
native Hawaiian people bear to the State of Hawaii and to the United States
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small but significant ways, faced with the task of transforming them-
selves in the handling of those multi-dimensional, multi-storied claims.
The Hawaii Supreme Court in Pele embarked on the beginnings of
this task indicating that it would, "in this case, clarify the role of
Hawaii's courts in enforcing the terms of the public lands trust.'' 7'
This nascent role transformation lends additional breadth to the setting
for our inquiry into court process and Native Hawaiians' right to sue.
III. NATIVE HAWAIIANS AND FEDERAL COURT BREACH OF TRUST
ACTIONS75
The Native Hawaiian federal court breach of trust cases examined
here are interrelated. They involve claims by, or on behalf of, the
same cultural group against the same institutional defendants. They
arise out of the same historical and geographical setting and assert
similaT legal claims. The federal courts' procedural rulings in these
cases are thus appropriately viewed collectively. They are connected
culturally through social-historical context. They are connected theo-
retically through procedural rhetorical constructs that tend to belie
value judgments about social relations. And they are connected func-
tionally through the collective guidance they provide to those contem-
plating future engagement with federal legal process on behalf of Native
Hawaiians specifically and America's indigenous peoples generally.
Native Hawaiians looked to the federal courts from the late 1970s
through the early 1990s. In varying, though related fashions, Native
Hawaiians sought the aid of federal judicial power both to reclaim
wrongfully alienated or used Hawaiian Homelands and Ceded Lands
and to communicate an emerging narrative about the centrality of
those lands to Native Hawaiians' cultural and political resurrection.
and to facilitate efforts of native Hawaiians to be governed by an indigenous
sovereign nation of their own choosing. In the spirit of self-determination and
by this Act, the Legislature seeks counsel from the native Hawaiian people on
the process of:
(1) holding a referendum to determine the will of the native Hawaiian people
to call a democratically convened convention for the purpose of achieving
consensus on an organic document that will propose the means for native
Hawaiians to operate under a government of their own choosing; ...
1993 HAW. SEss. LAWS 359.
" Pele, 73 Haw. at 591, 837 P.2d at 1257.
" Portions of Part III are drawn from substantially the same material to be published
by co-author Yamamoto in another law review's article.
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The legal claims- governmental breaches of trust. The source of the
legal claims-the Statehood Admissions Act,7 6 which explicitly recog-
nizes the state's trust obligations to Native Hawaiians concerning
management of Hawaiian Homelands and Ceded lands, and the Ha-
waiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA),7 7 which delineates specific
state responsibilities for homelands. The cultural claims-restoration of
Native Hawaiians socially and economically by enabling them to regain
control over the land and, for many, cultural and economic self-
determination. 78
Despite numerous case filings, the federal district courts rarely have
reached the "merits" of claims involving governmental breaches of
trust or fully explored the relationships in controversy.7 9 Furthermore,
the federal appellate courts have never affirmed a lower court finding
of a trust breach. Native Hawaiians' stories, and the cultural messages
underlying their claims, have rarely emerged as part of the courts'
ciltural performances about those claims.8 0 Procedural maneuvers by
governmental parties and rulings by the courts eventually blocked
avenues for full development and consideration of those Native Ha-
waiian stories and messages. What follows is a description of those
procedural maneuvers and the rhetorical constructs employed, especially
76 Admissions Act of March 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 [hereinafter
Admissions Act].
1 42 Stat. 108, reprinted in 1 HAW. REV. STAT. 167-205 (1985, Supp. 1992)
[hereinafter HHCA], originally Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920 (Pub. L.
No. 67-34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921)).
78 See supra notes 35, 36 and 40 and accompanying text. See also Friedman, supra
note 37, at 526. Friedman observes:
Native Hawaiian dignity, health, and cultural survival cannot be secured through
the existing trust mechanisms. Even if the trusts functioned perfectly, state or
federal government ownership and control of indigenous peoples' lands presents
insoluble philosophical problems. As a first step Native Hawaiians should recover
a land base, where Hawaiian self-governance would be recognized by the state
and federal governments. Ultimately, they should be accorded a measure of self-
determination. Native Hawaiians must be permitted to pursue the greater good
of their community in their own time-tested and unique way(emphasis omitted)
(citations omitted).
Id. at 526.
19 In one instance a federal district court found a breach of trust. That decision
was reversed on appeal for procedural reasons. See infra notes 82-101 and accompanying
text.
" See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text (concerning courts' cultural per-
formances).
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by the federal appellate courts, in reshaping the Native Hawaiian land
trust controversies.
Federalism and separation of powers concerns often undergird pro-
cedural rulings that appear to demonstrate federal court reluctance to
regulate state government affairs. As developed below, however, the
federal courts' apparent resistance to Native Hawaiian breach of trust
claims seems to extend deeper than ordinary federalism concerns about
the role of federal courts. 8'
The Ninth Circuit's sweeping, largely a-contextual subject matter
jurisdiction rulings erected initial barriers with long-term social con-
sequences. The foundational case is Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n
v. Hawaiian Homes Commission82 (Keaukaha I). This Ninth Circuit opinion
is discussed at some length because it sets the tone and establishes the
rhetorical framework for decisions that followed.
Keaukaha I said next to nothing about the actual controversy. The
opinion recited the following story. The Hawaiian Homes Commission
and the County of Hawaii agreed to exchange county lands for trust
lands the county needed for a flood-control project. The Hawaiian
Homes Commission transferred title to twenty acres of Homelands and
received nothing in return. The Keaukaha-Panaewa Community As-
sociation sued the Commission, alleging breaches of trust under the
Homelands Act and the Admissions Act. Beyond doubt, and the district
court so found, the Commission had violated its obligations under both
acts. 83
The Ninth Circuit reversed without considering the merits of the
Community Association's claims. First, it ruled that the federal courts
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over claims under the federal Home-
lands Act. Despite the Act's wholly federal origins and continuing
federal oversight of the Homelands Trust, the court ruled that the
Community Association's claims did not "arise under" federal law.8 4
The court stated that, when Hawai'i acquired principal trust admin-
istration responsibility upon statehood, the rights created under the
Homelands Act lost their federal "nature.''85 The "facts make it clear
"I See infra notes 102-122, 147-162 and accompanying text for a discussion about
federal courts jurisprudential concerns.
82 588 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1978).
Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, Civ.
No. 75-0260 (D. Haw., Sept. 1, 1976).
84 Keaukaha 1, 588 F.2d at 1226-27, n. 11.
" Id. at 1226 (emphasis omitted).
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that the rights plaintiffs seek to vindicate are state rights by nature
S. ." and might thus be "most appropriate for Hawaii's laws and
judicial system to deal with.' '86 The court ignored the historical and
continuing relationships of the United States and Native Hawaiians
when it found that "facts . . . made it clear that only state rights by
nature" were involved."7
Congress enacted the Homelands Act to return Native Hawaiians to
land illegally obtained by the United States. The legislation generated
a homelands base and established a federal program for administration.
The program was dreadfully administered."" As a condition of statehood
in 1959, Hawai'i incorporated the federal Homelands Act into its
constitution, received title to the Homelands in trust, and assumed
trust management responsibilities. The United States retained trust
enforcement and program supervisory responsibilities,8 9 requiring, among
other things, federal approval of certain state amendments to the
Homelands Act. The original federal Homelands Act has not been
repealed. 90 The court nevertheless found it "clear" that legal process
barred consideration of the Community Associations' claims under the
Homelands Act. 91
Next, the court held that although the Community Association's
claims arose under the federal Admissions Act, 92 triggering federal
court jurisdiction, the Association could not maintain those claims. 93
The Admissions Act, the court said, did not imply a private right of
action in favor of trust beneficiaries. 94 The Admissions Act authorizes
the United States to sue to enforce state trust obligations. 95 It is silent
as to enforcement by trust beneficiaries.
86 Id. at 1227 (emphasis omitted).
87 Id.
See, e.g., A BROKEN TRUST, supra note 35, at 43.
89 Admission Act §§ 4 & 5.
90 The original Act was deleted from the United States Code, but was never
repealed by Congress.
91 See also Price v. Hawaii, 764 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1985) (Price 1) (self-described
Native Hawaiian tribe lacks status as an "Indian tribe or band with a governing body
recognized by the Secretary of the Interior" to trigger federal subject matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1362. Id. at 626).
12 Keaukaha I, 588 F. 2d at 1220 (citing Admissions Act § 5(f)).
93 Id.
11 Id. at 631.
91 Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Association v. Hawaiian Homes Commission,
739 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1984).
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The court tortuously justified its "no-right-to-sue" conclusion. It did
so largely by resort to a sterile principle of statutory interpretation-
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or what is expressly provided for in
legislation negatives what is not included.96 That principle, taken
literally, means that a court can never construe a statute with specific
provisions to imply anything. The Ninth Circuit panel found that
principle to reflect a "presumption" against private enforcement ac-
tions, while struggling to distinguish a recent Supreme Court decision 97
undermining its analytical approach.
The court also distinguished in a brief footnote a seemingly con-
trolling Supreme Court case and a series of its own cases that established
the "co-plaintiff" doctrine in Native American trust cases. 98 That
doctrine enables trust beneficiaries to sue for trust enforcement of a
federally-created trust where the United States, the designated enforcer,
fails to do so. 99
Most revealing, in foreclosing private enforcement of breach of trust
claims, the court appeared to contradict itself on critical points. It first
Section 4 of the Admissions Act provides that:
[a]s a compact with the United States relating to the management and disposition
of the Hawaiian home lands, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as
amended, shall be adopted as a provision of the Constitution of said State, as
provided in section 7, subsection (b) of this Act, subject to amendment and
repeal only with the consent of the United States and in no other manner.
Admission Act of March 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, S 4, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
11 588 F.2d at 1221.
91 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) undermined Keaukaha I's reliance upon National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974), as the basis for its presumption against implied rights of action absent
specific evidence of legislative intent to create such implied rights. In Cort, the Supreme
Court signaled the opposite presumption concerning legislative intent-a presumption
in favor of an implied right of action absent legislative intent to the contrary. 422
U.S. at 82-83 n.14. The Ninth Circuit in Keaukaha I did not reconcile the analytical
approach it adopted concerning legislative intent with the contrary directive of Cort,
stating only "[wihatever the impact of Cort may be..." 588 F.2d at 1222. The court
also acknowledged the significance of the "general scheme and purposes" of the
Admissions Act but failed to address them in social-historical context. Id. at 1224.
98 Id. at n. 7.
99 See, e.g., Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442
F.2d 1184, 1186 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972) ("An Indian, as
the beneficial owner of lands held by the United States in trust has a right acting
independently of the United States to sue to protect his property interest," id. at
1186, relying on Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 369 (1968) (the purposes
of the trust "would be frustrated unless both the Indian and the United States were
empowered to seek judicial relief to protect" the trust. Id. at 369)).
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found Homelands Trust enforcement to be "purely" a state matter,
thereby depriving the federal court of jurisdiction under the Homelands
Act. 100 It later focused on the Admissions Act's designation of the
federal government as sole trust enforcer, thereby precluding private
enforcement actions by Native Hawaiian beneficiaries. 10
In sum, the Ninth Circuit found no federal jurisdiction to consider
Native Hawaiian breach of trust claims under the Homelands Act,
even though that statute arguably conferred private enforcement power
upon trust beneficiaries. It then found federal jurisdiction to consider
those Native Hawaiian claims under the Admissions Act, but found
no private right of enforcement by beneficiaries under the same statute.
Catch 22. Native Hawaiian Homeland claims dismissed without further
discussion.
Of special significance, the Ninth Circuit sharply rephrased this and
future Homelands controversies. It did so quietly by casting its rulings
in the language of process and ignoring, implicitly as irrelevant, the
likely sweeping practical, political and cultural consequences.
Practically, the court's rulings left Native Hawaiians without any
available legal forum despite, as the district court had found, clear
trust violations, the loss of additional trust land, and the continuing
harm to the 20,000 Native Hawaiians on the Homelands waiting list. 10 2
Politically, the court's subject matter jurisdiction ruling ("no federal
involvement") laid the foundation for the United States' sharp retreat
'00 Keaukaha I, 588 F.2d at 1224.
10, Id.
102 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), the United States
Supreme Court held that federal courts could not imply a private right of action under
the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982). Id. at 72. A Pueblo
woman and her daughter challenged the Santa Clara Pueblo's gender discriminatory
membership ordinance on equal protection grounds under the Act, which provided no
express private federal right of action. The Court declined to imply a right of action
in deference to Congress' policy of sovereignty for and self-government by Native
American tribes. 436 U.S. at 62-64. The Santa Clara Pueblo case raises significant issues
about the role of federal courts and "how the United States' government conceives of
its citizens as holding simultaneous membership in two political entities." Judith
Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, And The Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 671, 673 (1989). See also Robert Laurence, Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Opinions,
27 HOWARD L. J. 3 (1984). Keaukaha I apparently did not rely on Santa Clara Pueblo
because Native Hawaiians have not been recognized by Congress as a self-governing
entity and because, unlike the Santa Clara Pueblo who had a recognized tribal court
system, Native Hawaiians had at the time no other available legal forum (state or
"tribal") in which to bring their claims.
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on Native Hawaiian matters: former President Bush's administration
later relied on Keaukaha I to disavow any current federal trust obligations
to Native Hawaiians under the Homelands Act 1°3 and, ultimately, to
challenge the legality of federal funds and programs for Native Ha-
waiians. 104
Culturally, the court's procedural rulings scripted out of existence
the identity, struggles and messages of the people of the Keaukaha
Community Association. The court's opinion said nothing about those
Native Hawaiians concentrated in one economically struggling area of
Hilo, Hawai'i, attempting to survive and preserve a culture and a
community without adequate available land and housing despite des-
ignated Homelands in the area, unoccupied by Native Hawaiians. It
said nothing about the spiritual harm arising from the county's use of
Hawaiian Homelands amidst the Keaukaha-Panaewa community for a
major flood drainage project to protect the non-Homelands property
103 Just hours before the expiration of the Bush Administration's tenure, the De-
partment of the Interior issued a formal opinion declaring that the United States owed
no trust responsibility to Native Hawaiians. See THOMAS L. SANSONETTI, SOLICITOR,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, MEMORANDUM: THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIVE HAWAIIANS UNDER THE HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION
ACT 3 (Jan. 19, 1994); A BROKEN TRUST, supra note 35, at 9-11. The Department of
the Interior recently rescinded that earlier opinion. The Clinton administration's views
are not as yet clearly articulated.
,04 The Justice Department, during former President Bush's administration, declared
that special federal program funding for Native Hawaiians constituted an illegal
"racial" preference. This declaration rested upon the administration's position that
the federal government owed no trust responsibility to Native Hawaiians. Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), upheld the constitutionality of Congressional legislation
favoring Native Americans because of the trust relationship between the United States
and the Native American beneficiaries of the legislation. If, as the Hawaii federal
district court held in Han v. Department of Justice, 824 F. Supp. 1480 .(D. Haw.
1993) (on appeal), the federal government owes no trust obligations to Native Ha-
waiians, then Morton v. Mancari is inapplicable and, according to the Justice
Department, federal programs for Native Hawaiians may be constitutionally vulnerable.
The pillar in this syllogism is the Han case. Its key holding of "no federal trust
responsibility," however, is seemingly contradicted by the Hawaii federal district
court's earlier ruling in Naliielua v. State of Hawaii, 795 F. Supp. 1009, 1012-13 (D.
Haw. 1990), aff'd (mem.), 940 F.2d. 1535 (9th Cir. 1991), which upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, citing Morton v. Mancari.
The resolution of this apparent puzzle will have significant social and political
consequences. However it is resolved, one aspect of it is clear: Keaukaha l's procedural
ruling concerning subject matter jurisdiction provided the foundational building block
for the Bush administration's substantive position.
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of others. It said nothing about Native Hawaiians' intensifying resent-
ment toward those viewing Native Hawaiians as second-rate citizens
in their homeland and nothing about the growing sentiment among
many Native Hawaiians about the need to gain control of Homelands
and the Homelands program. That kind of resentment and sentiment
gave rise to one of the incidents described in the Prologue-Aupuni
O Hawai'i's recent angry confrontation over the Department of Ha-
waiian Homelands continued lease of Homelands for a shopping mall
just one mile from the Keaukaha area.' °5 What the court's Keaukaha I
opinion did say, in effect, reinforced a master socio-legal narrative
about Native Hawaiians: Native Hawaiian claims concerning the land
trusts debacle are unworthy of federal consideration, even though the
United States participated in the overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian
government and later created trust rights as a partial response, even
though the State in important ways continues to breach its inherited
Homelands trust obligations, and even though no other forums exist
to enforce Native Hawaiian land trust rights.'°6
After remand of Keaukaha I to the district court, but before dismissal,
the Community Association sought to amend its complaint to assert a
federal section 1983 civil rights claim against Hawaiian Homes Com-
mission officials, relying on an intervening Supreme Court decision.0 7
'01 That confrontation in the fall of 1993 occurred less than a mile from the Keaukaha
homestead area. As described in the Prologue, Aupuni 0' Hawai'i led a protest of
120 Hawaiians by holding a demonstration in the. Prince Kuhio Plaza shopping mall
in Hilo. The group protested the Department of Hawaiian Homelands' lease of a
prime 39-acre Homelands site to a private business while many Native Hawaiians in
the area still awaited homestead lot awards. The demonstration turned into a physical
confrontation when police arrived to arrest demonstrators for trespassing. Hugh Clark,
Police Seize 25 in Hilo Protest: Hawaiian Confrontation at the Mall, HONOLULU ADVERTISER,
October 6, 1993, p. A-1. See generally, Davianna McGregor-Alegado, Hawaiians: Or-
ganizing In The 1970s, 7 AMERASIA J. 229 (1980) (describing dynamics of political
organizing in Hawaiian communities).
1"6 See Newton, Indian Claims, supra note 18 at 765-768. Professor Newton describes
the federal government's complicity in efforts by the State of Georgia to "destroy the
Cherokee Nation" and then later in efforts by the new State of Oklahoma to deprive
the Cherokee Nation of valuable tribal lands held in trust by the United States. The
Cherokee Tribe filed suit in 1990 against the federal government in Claims Court for
"breach of fiduciary duty by mismanagement and nonfeasance." Reminiscent of
Keaukaha I, the court dismissed the principal claims on jurisdictional grounds without
reaching the merits or fully addressing the historical-cultural context of the claims.
Cherokee Nation v. United States, No. 218-89L, (Cl. Ct. Mar. 5, 1992).
'07 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (allowing a section 1983 action for
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The district court allowed the amendment and nevertheless dismissed
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit in Keaukaha II reversed. 0 8 Judge Schroeder's opinion
provided an initial glimmer of possibility for Native Hawaiians. The
opinion acknowledged that the "trust obligation is rooted in federal
law, and power to enforce that obligation is contained in federal law."' 09
At seeming odds with Keaukaha I, it concluded that Congress did not
in the Admissions Act itself foreclose private civil rights actions seeking
injunctive relief to enforce the Act's trust provisions. 1' 0 Subsequent
Native Hawaiian section 1983 claims have relied upon Keaukaha II."'
Keaukaha II's apparent strength-its specific declaration and its short,
precedent-based opinion-is also its weakness. Like Keaukaha I, the
case essentially adopted an a-historical frame of analysis and narrowly
employed a-contextual language of process to reach its result. In locating
Native Hawaiian claims within a civil rights framework, Keaukaha II
acknowledged neither the compelling historical and socio-cultural bases
for Native Hawaiians land claims nor the on-going political struggle
among Native Hawaiians, the state Homelands Commission and the
United States concerning control over and responsibility for Home-
lands. Nor did the opinion recognize the failure of traditional civil
rights discourse - addressing inequality of treatment of minority racial
groups - to capture the self-determination and nationalism underpin-
nings of native peoples' homelands claims. Finally, the opinion did not
address the manner in which the type of requested relief would limit
the availability of section 1983 civil rights claims for Native Hawaiians.
deprivation of a federal statutory right despite the statute's silence about a private
cause of action). Cf Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981) and Middlessex County, Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clarnmers Association,
453 U.S. 1 (1981).
08 Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 739 F.2d
1467 (9th Cir. 1984) [Keaukaha II]. In 1984 the Ninth Circuit also reversed the district
court's dismissal of a Native Hawaiian suit on qualified immunity grounds. Hoohuli
v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1984).
l01 739 F.2d at 1472.
"o Id. at 1471 (holding that the statute provides only for public enforcement, and
this alone does not foreclose private enforcement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
... See Ulaleo v. Paty, 902 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1990); Price v. Akaka, 3 F.3d 1220
(9th Cir. 1993) ("Akaka II"); Price I, 764 F.2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1985) (viewing §
5(f) of the federal Admissions Act as the "compact" between the United States and
the State of Hawai'i giving rise to the State's trust responsibilities); cf. Price v. Akaka,
928 F.2d 824, 826 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 436 (1991) ("Akaka I")
(citing § 4 of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act as the compact).
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Keaukaha 1i's court access implications have been directly and indi-
rectly whittled into oblivion. Sharp limitations on naming defendant
parties, remedies, the timing of suit and the re-adjudication of admin-
istratively-found facts have blocked Native Hawaiian section 1983 civil
rights claim development and presentation at practically every turn. 1 2
The procedural dismantling of Keaukaha 11 is reflected in the fact that
since the decision ten years ago no appellate opinion has reported on
the merits of a Native Hawaiian civil rights breach of trust claim. The
ostensibly neutral rhetoric of legal process has enabled the courts to
adopt or employ restrictive procedural rules while foregoing meaningful
analysis of the content of Native Hawaiian claims and their cultural
context as well as the likely social impacts of court rulings.'
1 3
Ulaleo v. Paty14 is illustrative. There, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a
Native Hawaiian's section 1983 civil rights suit seeking the return of
trust land allegedly transfered improperly to a private geothermal power
company for development in ways that desecrated Native Hawaiian
religious beliefs. The suit also sought the establishment of procedures
for future land transfers. The court announced that the Eleventh
Amendment "bars citizen suits [in federal courts] against states, insti-
tutional arms of the state, and state officials in their official capacity
when the relief requested is retrospective in nature."" ' 5 The court then,
in excruciating fashion, defined the type of federal court "retrospective"
relief disallowed under section 1983.
Twisting a 1986 Supreme Court decision,"16 the court ruled that
since the government officials' action complained of-the land trans-
fer-occurred in the past, Ulaleo's injunctive relief request was retro-
spective "in nature" and therefore barred. ' 7 Injunctive relief is
prospective only if it prevents or stops on-going legal violations by
governmental officials and therefore does not possibly entail the re-
"2 See infra notes 114-149 and accompanying text.
113 See ROBERT COVER AND OWEN Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1976)
(discussing "substance-sensitive" procedure and the ways in which procedure impacts
upon the social relationships and substantive norms in controversy); Yamamoto,
Efficiency's Threat, supra note 19, at 396-398 (discussing "procedural neutrality" and
the use of procedure as an "instrument of power").
, 902 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1990).
15 Id. at 1398.
116 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, at 279 (1986). See infra notes 220-224 and
accompanying text for a description and brief discussion of this case.
,7 Ulalo, 902 F.2d at 1400.
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medial expenditure of public funds. 18 The court declined to characterize
Ulaleo's requested injunction as relief to stop an "ongoing violation, ''19
even though the officials' initial wrongful action in transferring land
and continuing inaction in refusing to recover it meant for trust
beneficiaries' ongoing deprivation. Viewed most restrictively, the court
deemed "retrospective," and impermissible, all possible relief addressed
to administrative decisions already made. 2 °
"' Id. at 1399.
119 The court appeared to rely rigidly on a pleading rule that is supposed to be
liberally construed, indicating that Ulaleo's complaint had not specifically stated that
the requested injunction sought to stop an on-going trust violation. Id. at 1400.
120 Whether Ulaleo's holding will be consistently viewed and applied in a restrictive
fashion in the future is an open question. See KARL LEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH
(4th prtg. 1973) (describing how a case holding can be construed narrowly or broadly
depending on the circumstances of the case to which it is being applied and the
vantage point of the decisionmakers in the subsequent case). Ulaleo itself recognized
that the distinction between retrospective and prospective relief is not always clear.
902 F.2d at 1399 (relying on Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. at 667).
The Hawaii federal district court's most recent ruling, in Han v. Dept. of Justice,
824 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Haw. 1993), reflects a restrictive application of Ulalo. See supra
notes 104-14 and accompanying text. Napeahi v. Paty, 921 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1990)
appears to present a more expansive application. In Napeahi, the plaintiff claimed that
the State had breached its duty under the Ceded Lands trust by certifying a shoreline
boundary that appeared to create private land out of Ceded Land. Id. at 898. Plaintiff's
complaint sought "injunctive and declaratory remedies." Id. at 899. Finding an
inadequate record on which to rule, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court
for further findings.
On remand, the State raised numerous procedural objections. In its Motion to
Dismiss or For Entry of Judgment the State argued, among other things, that Ulaleo's
Eleventh Amendment immunity holding required dismissal of Napeahi. In both cases,
there was a loss of land due to the action of a state official. The main issue, according
to the State, was "when" the state violated its trust duty. In Napeahi, the State argued,
the State violated its trust obligations, if at all, in the past. The relief sought by
plaintiff was to restore the trust corpus-impermissible retrospective relief. Memoran-
dum in Support of Motion for Dismissal or Entry of Judgment After Remand, or, In
the Alternative, for 28 U.S.C. section 1292(B) Certification at 19-22, Napeahi v. Paty,
No. 85-1523 (D. Haw. Sept. 8, 1992). The district court rejected the State's argument.
According to the court, the proper focus under Ulaleo was not necessarily when the
alleged breach occurred, but whether the relief sought is prospective or retrospective.
Order at 9. Ulaleo had determined that the relief sought there would have required
the use of state funds to replenish the trust, which, the district court agreed, was a
forbidden retrospective relief. By contrast, in Napeahi the relief sought was an injunction
to force the state to attempt to recover the property through initiation of a lawsuit
against the private property owner - prospective relief even though the State would
have to pay the costs of the lawsuit. Order at 9-10. The district court's fine distinctions
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In practical doctrinal effect, the Ninth Circuit's Ulaleo ruling and
supporting ruling in Price v. State of Hawaii121 all but closed the door
Keaukaha H cracked opened. Keaukaha II allowed section 1983 civil
rights actions asserting breaches of trust by state officials. Ulaleo implied
that once state officials have acted, any possible legal relief for Native
Hawaiians will be deemed retrospective in nature and therefore beyond
the permissible bounds of the Eleventh Amendment.
Viewed in this restrictive fashion, the procedural labyrinth created
by Keaukaha I and II and Ulaleo left two procedural options for Native
Hawaiians. Those options, however, appear to be available in theory
and largely illusory in practice. One remaining option is filing a federal
section 1983 suit before official state action, seeking prospective in-
junctive relief. That option, however, runs headlong, in most instances,
into the ripeness doctrine. 12 In addition, since many administrative
in Han and Napeahi, in an effort to wrestle with the restrictive implications of Ulaleo,
are difficult to reconcile and operationalize.
121 921 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Price II"). Although the relief sought in Price
II-a declaration that the State was to be held to the high fiduciary standard of a
private trustee in managing the ceded lands trust-was deemed by the court to be
prospective in nature, Price agreed with Ulaleo that had the relief been retrospective,
suit would have been barred. Id. at 958 n.4. See also Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702,
706 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Price III") (citing Ulaleo, 902 F.2d at 1398-1400, for the
proposition that a suit seeking retrospective relief against state officials in their official
capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
Price II also recognized another barrier to federal breach of trust suits against state
officials-qualified immunity. State officials sued in their individual capacities for
damages must be shown to have acted in bad faith. Officials performing "discretionary
functions . . . are entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct 'does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known."' 921 F.2d at 958 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). Price II determined that where defendant officials' alleged trust breach was
based on an obligation not reasonably known at the time, the officials were entitled
to immunity. Id. at 959. See also Akaka I, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (section 1983 action
against state officials in their individual capacity is not barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment but is limited by doctrine of qualified immunity); Akaka II, 3 F.3d at 1220.
122 Even though section 1983 does not require an exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the ripeness doctrine and the Constitution's case or controversy requirement
pose substantial hurdles to pre-agency-action filing. Edwards v. District of Columbia,
628 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1985). One argument for circumventing the ripeness hurdle
exists where it can be shown that the state has engaged in a general repeated practice
applicable to a class of similar actions. In that instance a declaratory relief challenge
could be launched before agency action, not on grounds of likely improper agency
assessment of facts, but on grounds of the agency's erroneous view of its legal
obligations underlying its pattern of decisionmaking. See generally Joint Tribal Council
of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
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actions are taken without or with minimal prior community notice,
there is often little time for community organization of a prior legal
challenge. Catch 22 again.
A second option, in the relatively rare event of a trial-type agency
hearing, is filing suit and seeking prospective relief after agency adju-
dication but before agency action on its decision. This option, too, is
illusory. University of Tennessee v. Elliott23 held that determinations of
factual issues by a state agency acting in a quasi-judicial capacity-
even determinations unreviewed by a state court-preclude relitigation
of those issues in a subsequent federal section 1983 suit.' 2' The recently-
adopted administrative estoppel doctrine precludes federal court adju-
dication as long as the party estopped from litigating had an adequate
opportunity to litigate before the agency. 12 ' Thus, under that estoppel
doctrine, the unsuccessful assertion of breach of trust claims in the
administrative hearing process is likely to foreclose the one legal vehicle
available to Native Hawaiians after the Keaukaha cases-the federal
court section 1983 action for prospective relief.1
26
The apparent procedural dead-ends created by these labyrinthine
rulings are buttressed by other federal court rulings in Native Hawaiian
cases. For example, in Price I, the court rejected a Native Hawaiian
2 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
121 Id. at 799.
'2" Id. See also Butler v. City of North Little Rock, Arkansas, 980 F.2d 501 (8th
Cir. 1992) (res judicata precludes litigation of a section 1983 racial discrimination
claim even though Civil Service Commission excluded evidence of discrimination at
the hearing since additional evidence might have been offered during appeal to state
court). Cf Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)
(qualifying Elliot and holding agency estoppel doctrine inapplicable where Age Dis-
crimination Act scheme plainly contemplated federal suit after agency action).
26 A slim additional option for Native Hawaiians seeking entree into federal court
is to not participate in a trial-type administrative hearing, in the rare event one occurs,
and file suit after agency decision but before agency enforcement action. This tact's
disadvantages are several. By not participating, Native Hawaiians give up their first
and most direct chance to influence the original decision and collectively confront
frontline public decisionmakers. And suit might still be blocked. The federal court
might well conclude that since the agency already "decided," the relief sought is still
impermissibly retrospective. Or the court might apply the "virtual representation"
doctrine to preclude litigation by the second suit's plaintiff even though she was not
party to the first action, as long as her interests were virtually represented in the prior
proceeding. See MacArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340 (1985); Los Angeles Branch NAACP
v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1984) (virtual representation
doctrine).
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group's standing as a Native American tribe to invoke the jurisdictional
reach of 28 U.S.C. § 1362.127 In Price 11, the federal district court
imposed sanctions for frivolous filings by Native Hawaiians. 2 ' In
another case, the court relied upon the political question doctrine to
block a Native Hawaiian challenge to Ceded Lands revenue alloca-
tions. 12 9 In the only state suit against the United States for recovery of
federally misappropriated Homelands, the court denied the state claims
as time-barred. 30 The court also dismissed one case for failure to join
indispensable parties and cited the Eleventh Amendment to preclude
section 1983 breach of trust actions against state agencies in another. 3 '
In each of these cases, the courts' "cultural performance" trans-
formed the controversy, rephrasing Native Hawaiian claims about
physical and spiritual harm to real cultural communities arising out of
particularized breaches of fiduciary duty and systemic land trust failure
into technical questions of jurisdiction, indispensable parties, remedy
limitations and the like. The rhetorical framework of procedural neu-
trality established by those collective rulings largely silenced Native
Hawaiian stories about culture destruction through collective separation
from the land and about future Native Hawaiian self-determination
277 Price 1, 764 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1985) (court disallowed "tribal" jurisdiction under
section 1362 because the Hou Hawaiians group did not meet statutorily prescribed
criteria).
128 The district court in Price II imposed sanctions upon plaintiffs' counsel after
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, 921 F.2d 950, 958 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990)
(repetitive filing without clear grounds).
129 Price v. Ariyoshi, Civ. No. 85-1189 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 1987), Order Granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at 6-8 (dismissing challenge to allocation of only 20
percent of Ceded Lands revenues for the benefit of Native Hawaiians, observing
"[a]ny recommendation for change must be addressed solely to the Hawaii legisla-
ture"); see also Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154,
737 P.2d 446 (1987) (political question doctrine applied by Hawaii Supreme Court).
'0 Hawaii v. United States, 676 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Haw. 1988), 866 F.2d 313 (9th
Cir. 1989) (claim under Quiet Title Act time barred). It would seem, however, that
an action in Claims Court under the Tucker Act for prospective rents might not be
time barred. The argument would be that -he United State's continued possession and
use of the trust asset constitutes a continuing trust breach that in effect tolls the state
of limitations.. One problem with this argument is that the plaintiff State might be
deemed to have split its cause of action in the initial litigation and therefore have its
Tucker Act claim barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
"3I Ulaleo v. Paty, No. 88-00320 (D. Haw. 1988) (dismissing on the ground of a
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 failure to join indispensable parties, among other grounds);
Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying established section
1983 principles in precluding suit against state agencies).
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through control of the trusts land base. That framework also quietly
distanced the United States from its historical role and legal obligations.
Not one reported opinion in the numerous Native Hawaiian federal
breach of trust cases fully reached these stories of power and culture.
In short, the courts' cultural performances rescripted Native Hawaiians'
phrasing of their claims and thereby eviscerated the stories giving life
to those claims.
The story of Native Hawaiians in federal court continues. Recent
United States Supreme Court cases may permanently close the re-
maining crack in the courthouse door. According to arguments by the
Hawaii Attorney General in recent cases, Suter v. Artist M. 13 forecloses
Native Hawaiian section 1983 civil rights claims under the Admissions
Act, and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife3 deprives Native Hawaiian
plaintiffs of standing to sue for breaches of trust.
134
In Price v. Akaka13 5 ("Akaka IT"), the federal district court rejected
the State's Suter argument.1 36 On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit
,31 112 S. Ct. 1360, 118 L. Ed.2d 1 (1992).
133 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed.2d 351 (1992).
134 Suter involved a section of the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980. That Act made a state eligible for reimbursement of certain foster care
expenses if the state submitted a plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
which provided that "reasonable efforts" would be made to keep children in their
homes and to facilitate reunification of separated families. Plaintiffs, beneficiaries under
the Act, filed a class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the state
of Illinois failed to make the requisite "reasonable efforts." Federal jurisdiction was
premised on section 1983 and on an implied right of action under the federal Adoption
Act. Both the district court and court of appeals found federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
The Supreme Court reversed. Ignoring its established section 1983 framework of
analysis, the Court announced a new approach. Whether plaintiffs could bring a
section 1983 claim against state officials to enforce the Adoption Act turned upon one
question: "Did Congress, in enacting the Adoption Act, unambiguously confer upon
the child beneficiaries of the Act a right to enforce the requirement that the State
make 'reasonable efforts' to prevent a child from being removed from his home, and
once removed to reunify the child with his family?" Id. at 1367. The Suter majority
deemed irrelevant its acknowledgement that the Adoption Act "may not provide a
comprehensive enforcement mechanism so as to manifest Congress' intent to foreclose
(private) remedies under section 1983." Id. at 1368. The Court focused on the
opportunity for public enforcement. The term "reasonable efforts" in this context is
"at least as plausibly read to impose only a rather generalized duty on the State, to
be enforced not by private individuals, but by the Secretary." Id. at 1370.
'3 3 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1993).
36 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Judgment on the
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affirmed, observing that Keaukaha 11 and Akaka I were not inconsistent
with Suter. The court maintained a slim crack in the federal courthouse
door for Native Hawaiians, holding that the Admissions Act is a federal
public trust "which by its nature creates a federally enforceable right
for its beneficiaries to maintain an action [section 1983] against the
trustee in breach of the trust. ''137
The State in its subsequent brief in the pending Han v. Department
of Justice13s appeal nevertheless continued to argue that Suter overruled
Keaukaha II, asserting that Akaka 11 was restricted from overruling
Keaukaha 11 by the law of the case doctrine and therefore made no de
novo determination on the impact of Suter.'3 9 Thus, despite several
rulings, an air of uncertainty still surrounds the one federal jurisdic-
tional avenue available to Native Hawaiians to enforce trust obligations.
Additional uncertainty surrounds the issue of Native Hawaiian stand-
ing. 4 0 The State recently argued that, based on Lujan, Native Hawai-
ians lack federal court standing to challenge improper uses of trust
Pleadings or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Price v. Akaka, No. 88-773
(D.Haw. June 12, 1992), at 10. "[I]n the absence of an overruling of prior precedent,
this court cannot disregard the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Keaukaha II, and the direct
mandate to this court that plaintiffs in this case have stated a claim under S 5(f) of
the Admission Act that is enforceable via 5 1983." The State raised the same Suter
argument in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Dismissal or Entry of Judgment
After Remand, or, in the Alternative, For 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B) Certification, in
Napeahi v. Paty, No. 85-1523 (D. Haw. filed Oct. 26, 1992). The district court there
also rejected the State's claim that Suter overruled Keaukaha I. Noting that Suter did
not apply the same test that had been used in earlier decisions, the court stated that
Suter did not overrule the old test, and was in harmony with that test.
131 Id. at 1225.
118 824 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Haw. 1993) (appeal pending). See supra note 120.
,1" Respondents Answering Brief, Han v. Department of Justice.
'4' The Ninth Circuit has consistently recognized Native Hawaiian standing to sue
to enforce trust obligations under both the Homelands trust and the Ceded Lands
trust. See Price I, 764 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1985); Akaka I, 928 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.
1990); Price III, 939 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1991). Despite apparently settled federal
standing law, the State recently argued that a 1992 Supreme Court case, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, deprives Native Hawaiians of federal court standing to sue to
enforce the Ceded Lands Trust. Lujan involved an environmental group's challenge
to a new regulation enacted under the Endangered Species Act limiting its geographic
scope. The plaintiffs' injury for purposes of standing was indirect; it rested in part on
the actions of a third person. In rejecting plaintiffs' standing, the Court observed that
if plaintiffs' asserted injury resulted from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation
"of someone else" standing is difficult to achieve.
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 16:1
funds or lands unless they show a direct injury to themselves."' The
State's argument amounted to a contention that Native Hawaiians
almost never have standing to sue for land trust breaches. Since Native
Hawaiians usually cannot establish a State duty to act for the benefit
of any particular Native Hawaiian group or to use or manage particular
land for the benefit of a specific group, under the State's view of Lul'an,
Native Hawaiian plaintiffs rarely if ever would be able to establish the
requisite "direct injury' 142 .
In 1992, the Hawaii federal district court on remand in Price v.
Akaka 14 3 rejected the State's argument. The court concluded that Lujan
did not overrule the Ninth Circuit's past decisions conferring Native
Hawaiian standing.1 4 4 Nevertheless, in Napeahi v. Paty,145 the State
reiterated its lack of standing argument. Again, the district court refused
to deny standing to Native Hawaiians challenging .the disposition of
Ceded Lands. The court, however, in both Price and Napeahi, certified
interlocutory appeals. Certification suggests the district court's lingering
uncertainty on the issue and the State's persistence in attempting to
erect insurmountable procedural obstacles to federal court process for
Native Hawaiians. 14
6
Why might the State, as the acknowledged Native Hawaiian lands
trustee, persist in efforts to close even the slimmest of openings in the
federal courthouse doors? Some grounded speculation about State
interests is in order. One answer, perhaps misleadingly simple, is that
the State is acting as would any fiduciary: it is attempting to shield
itself from liability. It might be doing so for economic reasons or to
1' Price v. Akaka, No. 88-773 (D. Haw. filed July 31, 1992) (order granting in
part and denying in part motion for reconsideration, or in the alternative, for
certification).
142 Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2144, 119 L. Ed.2d at 373.
14 Price v. Akaka, No. 88-733 (D. Haw. filed July 31, 1992). See infra note 146 for
discussion.
I4 !d.
' ' No. 85-1523 (D. Haw. filed Oct. 26, 1992) (order denying defendant's motion
for dismissal or entry of judgment after remand, or, in the alternative, for 28 U.S.C.
5 1292(B) certification).
6 Recently, the Ninth Circuit in Price v. Akaka, 3 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Akaka II), upheld the district court's standing decision. The court determined that,
in contrast with Lujan, Akaka II did not "involve a suit against government for
promulgating an unlawful regulation or for failing to promulgate a regulation." Id. at
1224. Since the plaintiff was "among the class of 5 5(f) beneficiaries whose welfare is
the object of the action at issue[.], . . . the [trustees'] action or inaction has caused
him injury, and . . . a judgment preventing or requiring action will redress it." Id.
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assure maximum flexibility under constraining political circum-
stances.1 47 Another answer might lie in the State administration's efforts
to minimize entanglement in federal court remedial efforts while mount-
ing its own political campaign to address Native Hawaiian demands
for sovereignty and return of Hawaiian lands.' A third and related
answer might lie in State actors' implicit concerns about control over
socio-legal narratives regarding foundations for the Native Hawaiian
sovereignty initiatives. Those actors might be concerned about the
federal courts' "cultural performance" in rephrasing volatile Native
Hawaiian land disputes.1 49 Why might the federal courts, and especially
the Ninth Circuit, have opened the procedural door for Native Ha-
waiians with one hand and all but closed it with the other? Why might
the federal courts have employed procedural tools to rephrase Native
Hawaiian land controversies by blocking or sharply limiting their
development and telling within the judicial process? More grounded
speculation is in order.
One answer simply might be the federal courts' displeasure with
several factually under-developed or poorly litigated cases-cases which
called for early disposition on procedural grounds. Another answer
might lie in the federal courts' fealty to established procedural doctrines
that are ordinarily applied in social-cultural civil rights situations
markedly different, both historically and presently, from the situation
of Native Hawaiians. This possibility raises the issue of the appropri-
,41 In his legislative testimony against Native Hawaiian right-to-sue bills in 1987,
the former State Attorney General stated that an expansive right to sue would bankrupt
the State. Hearings on [H.R. 37 (H.D. 1), Relating to the Right to Sue by Native
Hawaiian Individuals and Organizations], 14th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1987) (testimony of
the Honorable Warren Price, III, Attorney General of the State of Hawaii).
' Former Governor John Waihee created the Hawaiian Sovereignty Advisory
Commission pursuant to Act 359 of the 1993 State Legislative Session. The Act
mandated that the Commission consult with the Native Hawaiian community on its
concerns with respect to sovereignty. 1993 HAW. SEss. LAWS 359. The Commission
held a series of statewide community meetings. A recurring theme at nearly every
meeting was the concern over the state government's efforts to perhaps control the
process of self-determination. As a result, the Commission took the position that the
State must support the sovereignty efforts of Hawaiians while being careful not to
impose any particular form of sovereignty upon them. In response, the Administration
sought, through draft legislation, to transform the Commission into the "authoritative
body on conducting the Hawaiian sovereignty elections." Bill Meheula, Hawaiian
Sovereignty (Advisory) Commission Report, KE KiA'i, December 1, 1993, vol.4, no. 9, at
16-17.
"I See supra note 46.
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ateness of the "trans-substantivity" of procedure. The Federal Rules'
drafters contemplated a single set of process rules that would be applied
in similar fashion to all types of controversies and parties. Procedure
was to be trans-substantive. Most judges have followed that approach.
Current procedural debate questions whether this approach is insensi-
tive to the widely varying contexts of disputes. 150
Another answer might lie in notions of separations of power and
judicial competence-a reluctance of federal courts to intervene in what
is perceived by many to be a wide-ranging political dispute that should
be addressed through administrative or legislative action. 15' Since the
early 1980s federal courts have hesitated to fashion complicated equi-
table remedies in "structural governmental reform" cases, suggesting
instead the appropriateness of legislative correctives. 5 2
Another related answer might lie in federalism concerns-at a deep
level, the inappropriateness of entangling the federal government (as
adjudicator and as possible litigant) in a social-political struggle that
focuses now on an indigenous group's conflicts with a state. These
concerns raise the federal courts jurisprudential issue of sovereignty-
that is, the "relationships among the governmental entities in the
United States, and specifically, between the federal courts and the
states.''53 The more commonly addressed questions about state auton-
omy versus federal control are complicated by Native Hawaiian claims
of rights of self-governance. Those claims ambiguously introduce con-
sideration of a third entity into the federal courts sovereignty calculus.
Consideration is ambiguous because Native Hawaiian self-governance
claims are both inchoate and vaguely-defined. They are inchoate be-
cause, in contrast with Native American claims of limited tribal sov-
ereignty, Native Hawaiian claims have never received Congressional
or federal executive branch recognition. Native Hawaiian claims are
"o See COVER AND Fiss, supra note 113; Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 19.
Trans-substantivity proponents believe that differing sets of rules should not be pre-
shaped to fit differing types of claims, parties or controversies. Indeed, the FRCP's
drafters opted for a single set of flexible trans-substantive procedural rules to address
all types of civil litigation. Despite recent calls for substance-tailored sets of procedures,
federal district courts have adhered to the Rules' drafter's philosophical approach.
'5 See Resnik, supra note 102, at 675. (describing judicial reticence sometimes as a
product of separation of powers notions, and describing the "power" theme of federal
court jurisprudence in terms of "allocation and constraint by separation of functions"
among branches of government).
02 See generally Paul Gewirtz, Remedies And Resistance, 92 YALE L. J. 585 (1983).
"' Resnik, supra note 102, at 675.
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vaguely-defined because Native Hawaiian groups have advanced widely-
diverging positions and because in recent years the federal executive
branch has evinced a desire to relinquish any remaining federal control
over and responsibility for Native Hawaiians as a group without vesting
control in Native Hawaiians themselves. 54 The federal government's
apparent move to diminish relational ties with Native Hawaiians with-
out recognizing any form of Native Hawaiian self-governance stands
in stark contrast with the government's acknowledged plenary power
over its "dependent sovereigns" -Native American tribes.155
In this setting the question arises-are the federal court's at some
deep level ceding power over Native Hawaiian issues to the state
generally and state courts particularly?5 6 And if so, are they doing this
114 See supra note 103 and accompanying text discussing then-President Bush's
administration's declaration of no federal trust responsibility to Native Hawaiians. The
current administration has apologized for the United States' participation in the
overthrow of the Hawaiian government in 1893. 107 STAT. 1510 (1993). However, it
has at best hedged on any further federal involvement.
How to achieve self-governance, and in what form, is a continuous source of
controversy and debate among Hawaiian groups. Ka Lahui Hawai'i, the largest and
most widely recognized sovereignty group, has held a constitutional convention and
adopted a constitution. The group's platform calls for a land base consisting of
Hawaiian Homelands and Ceded Lands and federal recognition of Hawaiians as a
"nation within a nation." Ka Lahui's sovereignty model is patterned after the
relationship between the United States and American Indian tribes. MACKENZIE, supra
note 8, at 92. Other groups such as Ka Pakaukau see total independence as the
ultimate goal but appear willing to accept a transitional "nation within a nation"
period. Still other groups seek total and immediate independence.
During its 1993 session, the Hawai'i legislature passed a state Administration bill
to create the Hawaiian Sovereignty Advisory Commission. 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 359.
The Act established the Advisory Commission to advise the legislature on ways to
foster Native Hawaiian self-determination. See also NATIVE HAWAIIANS STUDY COMMIS-
SION REPORT ON THE CULTURE, NEEDS AND CONCERNS OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS (1983"
(discussing self-governance possibilities).
"I See Resnik, supra note 102 (describing American Indian tribes as "dependent
sovereigns"); See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, And Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 197-98 (discussing sources of and
limits to Congress' "plenary power" over Indian tribes).
"I Judith Resnik poses the question in terms of "[w]hat animates [occasional federal
court] support for other decision centers?" Resnik, supra note 102, at 746. Professor
Resnik sets this question within the observation that,
[w]ith fluctuations over time, the federal government and its courts have con-
sistently permitted other (lesser) power centers to function and sometimes even
to flourish. Federal courts have crafted doctrines of comity and deference, and
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for reasons of comity (deferring to state court resolutions of complex
have ceded jurisdiction and authority to other court systems - state and tribal.
Id. at 746-47.
That federal court deferral to state courts is "occasional" is illustrated by the
McBryde/Robinson line of cases. In McBryde Sugar Company v. Robinson, 54 Haw.
174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973), sugar growers brought a Hawai'i state court suit to
determine their water rights to storm and freshet water in Kauai's Hanapepe River.
The trial court determined the parties' private water rights and allocated water
accordingly. The Hawai'i Supreme Court, sua sponte, appeared to rewrite state water
law, which had previously recognized private water ownership. It held that the State
owned all waters of the river, subject only to appurtenant and riparian rights. It also
held that the waters could not be diverted outside the river's watershed. See also
McBryde Sugar Company v. Robinson, 55 Haw. 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973) (on rehearing
reaffirming its pronouncements).
Angry sugar growers then brought suit in federal district court to enjoin enforcement
of the McBryde decision on the grounds that the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decisions
denied the growers federal procedural and substantive due process. Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977). Without addressing the propriety of
federal court review, the district court held that the Hawai'i Supreme Court had, in
effect, "taken" the property of the parties without just compensation when it retro-
actively converted private property rights in water to public property rights. The
district court harshly criticized the Hawai'i Supreme Court, calling McBryde "one of
the grossest examples of unfettered judicial construction used to achieve the result
desired-regardless of its effect upon the parties, or the state of the prior law on the
subject." 441 F. Supp. at 568.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Hawaii Supreme Court was "well within its judicial
power" when it overruled earlier Hawai'i cases. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468,
1474 (9th Cir. 1985). The state court could not, however, divest prior private rights
without just compensation. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless dissolved the district court
injunction, noting that state officers had not as yet taken steps to interfere with the
parties' formerly private water rights. Id. Concerning the propriety of reviewing the
Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit observed that "horizontal appeals
will not lie to the United States District Courts to overturn allegedly erroneous
decisions on federal constitutional questions by the highest court of a state." Id. at
1471. The court determined, however, that the federal constitutional questions were
not (and could not have been) addressed by the Hawai'i Supreme Court in the McBryde
cases and were therefore appropriate for federal court consideration. Id. at 1472 (citing
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
The federal district court's "intervention" into state court prerogatives, according
to one commentator, implies that "there would be no judicial hierarchy and no finality
in appellate systems." Williamson B. C. Chang, Unraveling Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can
Courts "Take" Property?, 2 U. HAW. L. REV. 57, 91 (1979). Another commentator
criticized the district court and Ninth Circuit for attempting to assess independently
Hawai'i water law. Bradford H. Lamb, Robinson v. Ariyoshi: A Federal Intrusion Upon
State Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L. 325, 353 (1987). For subsequent history in the Robinson
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and controversial land-sovereignty based disputes between the State
and Native Hawaiians), for reasons of social policy (distancing the
federal government from "special" treatment of Native Hawaiians, a
move generally reminiscent of the government's earlier "termination"
policy concerning Native American tribes15 7), or for other reasons? No
clear answers emerge.
One possible "other reason" might be that the federal courts'
recognize a state's "ability to maintain different modes from those
[individualistic and atomistic modes] of the federal government."' 15
Implicit in this recognition might be a sense that in smaller, community-
based decisional centers "there are social ties, there is a shared history,
there is a network of relatedness."' 5 9 As Judith Resnik observes, when
federal courts defer to state or tribal courts on matters concerning
indigenous peoples, "[s]ome deep-seated emotional respect for group
governance may be at work here, some sense that these self-contained
communities are 'jurisgenerative' [communally law creating]. . .and
that their traditions and customs must sometimes be respected and
preserved.' ' 60 In this speculative light, a final question arises. Are the
Hawaii state courts willing to serve, and do they have the capacity to
serve, in such a jurisgenerative capacity for Native Hawaiians? This
question is addressed in preliminary fashion in the next section.
cases, see Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902 (1986) (granting certiorari and vacating
judgment of Ninth Circuit, and remanding for further consideration in light of
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985)); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 796 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanding to district
court in light of Supreme Court directive); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002
(D. Haw. 1987) (upholding the district court's original finding of a ripe controversy);
and Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989) (vacating the district court's
decision).
117 The federal government in the 1950s adopted a policy of "termination" con-
cerning Indian tribes, seeking to strip tribes of special status in relationship to the
government and to "mainstream" them into American society. See H.R. CON. REs.
108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), in 67 Stat. B.132 (identifying termination of distinct
status of Indian tribes, and the dissolution of tribes, as the long-term goals of federal
Indian policies).
"' Resnik, supra note 102, at 751.
159 Id.
160 Id. The term "jurisgenerative," along with its antinomic counterpart, "juris-
pathic," were coined by Robert Cover to describe the ways in which courts through
language and procedure can destroy or affirm law created by communities. Robert
M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -Foreward: Nomos And Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REv. 4 (1983).
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Whatever the federal and state interests involved, whatever the
perspectives of key actors or their underlying rationales, the federal
court's process rulings in Native Hawaiian cases can be viewed cu-
mulatively from at least two critical vantage points. Doctrinally, those
rulings have all but closed federal courthouse doors for Native Hawai-
ians seeking injunctive or structural relief in land trust controversies.
For Native Hawaiians contemplating engagement in the federal judicial
process to effectuate personal claims or to further larger legal-political
claims, the rulings have been prohibitory.16 Conceptually, in terms of
communicative process, those rulings have transformed the specific
stories of Native Hawaiian claimants and larger narratives of Native
Hawaiian movements into narrow questions of legal process and pro-
cedure. In doing so, they have generated sharply limited, and from
the perspective of claimants, distorted cultural performances concerning
the heart of many Native Hawaiian land trust controversies. An
attorney for a Native Hawaiian law collective recently expressed this
view in his comment, "We definitely avoid federal court. We get tied
up in procedural knots there and the community never fully gets to
say its piece.' 1 62
IV. NATIVE HAWAIIAN STATE COURT BREACH OF TRUST ACTIONS:
PELE DEFENSE FUND v. PATY
The procedural door to federal court appears to be all but closed for
Native Hawaiian breach of trust claimants. In comparison, Hawai'i's
state courts offer both considerable promise and uncertainty. The
appellate courts appear to be engaged in a process of partial self-
transformation. That process evinces a rethinking of the performance
role of state courts in addressing Native Hawaiian rights claims. In
terms of historical comparisons, the Hawai'i Supreme Court's citation
to customary cultural practices to inform and transform established
legal norms 163 is remihiscent of the earlier Richardson Court. That court,
under the guidance of former Chief Justice William S. Richardson,
See infra Part IV for description of prohibitory effects.
162 Interview with Alan Murakami, litigation director for the Native Hawaiian Legal
Corporation (NHLG). (Interview with co-authors on December 15, 1993). Mr. Mu-
rakami and the NHLC served as counsel for plaintiffs in Pele Defense Fund v. Paty and
co-counsel for plaintiffs in Ka'ai'ai v. Drake (see infra notes 167 and 279), among other
cases.
63 See infra note 179.
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was noted for its contextual historical and cultural analysis. 164 In terms
of current practice, the court's recent Hawaiian land pronouncements
are set within accelerating Hawaiian self-determination movements.
16
Those pronouncements reveal a court uniquely poised to scrutinize
prevailing views, or narratives, about the meaning of Native Hawaiians
rights claims.'6 The focal point of this section is the Hawai'i Supreme
Court's recent right-to-sue decision, Pele Defense Fund v. Paty. 67
A. The Federal Court Suit
Pele involved a land exchange on the island of await' between the
State of Hawai'i and the private Estate of James Campbell. On
December 23, 1985 the State swapped 27,800 acres of Ceded Land for
25,800 acres of Campbell Estate land to allow geothermal development
of that portion of the Ceded Land designated as a geothermal resource
zone. Relying on Keaukaha-I,'6 the Pele Defense Fund (PDF)169 and
164 In Justice William J. Brennan Jr.'s address during the tenth anniversary of the
William S. Richardson School of Law, Justice Brennan spoke of the Richardson
Court's progressiveness citing, "the noteworthy constitutional contribution of the
Hawaii Supreme Court under Chief Justice Richardson's leadership." Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr., Address Of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 6 U. HAW. L. REv. 1, 3
(1984). See, e.g., Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, 65 Haw. 531, 656 P.2d 57 (1982)
(describing and accommodating customary Native Hawaiian values in its decisions
concerning control over surface water); Ahuna v. Department of Hawaiian Homelands,
64 Haw. 327, 640 p.2d 1161 (1982) (defining the scope of the State's fiduciary duty
to manage Hawaiian Homelands).
165 Act 359 relating to the creation of the Hawaiian Sovereignty Advisory Commission
is the State Administration's effort to help facilitate some form of native Hawaiian
self-determination:
(1) Holding a referendum to determine the will of the native Hawaiian people
to call a democratically convened convention for the purpose of achieving
consensus on an organic document that will propose the means for native
Hawaiians to operate under a government of their own choosing; ...
1993 HAW. SEss. LAWS 359.
366 For a discussion of Kealoha v. Hee and the plaintiff's assertion of international
human rights legal norms in state court, see Prologue. See also supra note 6.
167 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247 (1992), cert. denied., 113 S. Ct. 1277 (1993).
36 739 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1984) See supra notes 107-113 and accompanying text.
369 PDF is an organization comprised of Native Hawaiians who have as their purpose
the revitalization and preservation of their nearly extinct culture. Their mission in this
instance was to focus attention on not merely the impact land exchanges have on
section 5(f) trust purposes but also on Hawaiian culture. In Pele, they claimed the
exchange took land having religious and cultural value for Native Hawaiians and
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Kaolelo Lambert John Ulaleo filed a federal section 1983 civil rights
action in the United States District Court for the District of Hawai'i
seeking to invalidate the land exchange. For them, private geothermal
development on those specific Ceded Lands would desecrate sacred
land believed to be the home of the "aumakua" (god) Pele and would
harm Hawaiian cultural and religious values and practices. 70 The
district court dismissed their claims.' The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 7 2
Before the Ninth Circuit's affirmance, PDF filed related claims in state
circuit court.
73
B. The State Court Suit
In state court, PDF advanced a federal law claim and a state law
claim. PDF claimed, among other things,1 74 (1) breach of the Ceded
substituted it with Campbell Estate land substantially covered with lava having little
or no such significance. PDF members therefore sought access denied them by
defendants into undeveloped areas of Wao Kele '0 Puna for traditional subsistence,
cultural, and religious purposes. Pele, 73 Haw. at 584-85, 837 P.2d at 1253-54.
170 Interview with Alan Murakami, March 15, 1993. Mr. Murakami, as litigation
director for the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, represented PDF and Mr. Ulaleo
in Ulaleo v. Paty, No. 88-00320 (D. Haw. 1988), and PDF in Pele Defense Fund v.
Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1277 (1993).
171 Id. The court dismissed on grounds that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the
State's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court also ruled that the State
was an indispensable party to the breach of trust claims against defendants. The
Hawai'i Supreme Court in Pete agreed and held that the State's absence as a party
resulted in "no adequate remedy available for the alleged breaches." Pele, 73 Haw.
at 613, 837 P.2d at 1268.
172 Ulaleo v. Paty, 902 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit held that the
suit requested retrospective relief and was therefore barred. See supra notes 114-120
and accompanying text.
"I PDF filed its claims in state court on March 10, 1989. In early 1990, while the
appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, Ulaleo died. Emily 'Iwalani Naeole, a Native
Hawaiian and resident of the ahupua'a (division of land from ocean to mountain)
adjoining Wao Kele '0 Puna, moved to intervene as a plaintiff. Her motion was
denied on the premise that PDF adequately represented her interests. The case
proceeded in the Third Circuit Court for the State of Hawai'i as Pele Defense Fund v.
Paty. Pele, 73 Haw. at 588-89, 837 P.2d at 1255-56.
"I Other claims alleged: (1) a violation of due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution;
(2) a violation of the right to free association under the first amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and article I, section 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution; (3) a violation of
article XII, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution by the relinquishment of state lands
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Lands trust on the part of the Board of Land and Natural Resources
under § 5(f) of the Admissions Act, in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1983, '7
and (2) breach of trust by the State under Article XII, § 4 of the
Hawai'i Constitution. 7 6 PDF requested that the court find "Campbell
• . . h[e]ld the exchanged lands subject to a constructive trust for the
beneficiaries of the public lands trust."'77 The circuit court granted the
State's summary judgment motion for procedural reasons.'7 8 The Ha-
wai'i Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of PDF's breach of trust
claims. 17 9 The court's decision turned on its analysis of issues of process
and procedure without reaching the substantive claims.
on which native Hawaiians customarily and traditionally exercised subsistence, cultural,
and religious practices and continued denial of access into Wao Kele 0' Puna to
native Hawaiian PDF members who sought access for customarily and traditionally
exercised subsistence, cultural and religious practices; (4) violations of HRS subsection
171-26 and 171-50; and (5) a violation of HRS chapter 195. Pete, 73 Haw. at 589-90,
837 P.2d at 1256.
,71 The Board of Land and Natural Resources is the executive board for the
Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR). DLNR is charged with the
administration of public lands. Public lands include those under the § 5(f) trust. Prior
to the land swap, Wao Kele '0 Puna was part of the Natural Area Reserves System
(NARS) which HAW. REV. STAT. § 195 defines as land containing 'unique natural
resources,' [that] should be preserved 'in perpetuity."' Pete 73 Haw. at 587, 837 P.2d
at 1254-55. As the result of (1) an amendment to HAW. REV. STAT § 195 which, in
effect, "allow[ed] alienation of NARS land for 'another public use upon a finding by
the [DLNR] of an imperative and unavoidable public necessity;' (2) "the designation
of a portion of the Kilauea Middle East Rift Zone . . . , located primarily within
Wao Kele '0 Puna, as a geothermal resource subzone;" (3) the affirmance in Dedman
v. BLNR, 69 Haw. 255, 740 P.2d 28 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1020 (1988) of
BLNR's designation and "granting of a geothermal development permit;" and (4)
legislative inaction, Wao Kele '0 Puna was transferred out of NARS. BLNR's
contribution to this result was the basis of PDF's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. Pete, 73
Haw. at 587-88, 837 P.2d at 1255 (quoting HAW. REv. STAT. § 195-10 (Supp. 1991)).
176 The State in Article XII, § 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution affirms its fiduciary
obligations under the § 5(f) trust. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 4. PDF claimed the State
had violated the terms of the Ceded Lands trust by permitting the land exchange.
Pete, 73 Haw. at 601, 837 P.2d at 1261-&2.
117 Id. at 590, 837 P.2d at 1256.
'71 The third circuit court held that PDF's federal section 1983 claims were barred
by the state's sovereign immunity, PDF's lack of standing, the statute of limitations,
and the res judicata effect of Ulateo, 902 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1990). The circuit court
dismissed PDF's state breach of trust claim stating there was no private right of action
to enforce the terms of the § 5(f) trust under Hawai'i law.
"I In addition, the court reversed the circuit court's dismissal of PDF's Kalipi
gathering rights claim. The Court reversed in part and remanded for trial the issue
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1. Section 1983 Civil Rights Claims: Federal law breach of trust claims
in state court
PDF's federal law claims in state court faced numerous procedural
obstacles. As mentioned earlier, the Ninth Circuit ruled in 1978 that
no federal private right of action existed under the Admissions Act,
although it later recognized a federal law section 1983 civil rights claim
to enforce trust rights created under the Admissions Act.18 ° PDF sought
of whether defendants violated Article XII, S 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution by denying
access into undeveloped lands to Native Hawaiian PDF members who sought access
for customarily and traditionally exercised subsistence, cultural and religious practices.
Pete, 73 Haw. at 621, 837 P.2d at 1272. In all other respects, the court affirmed the
lower court's decision. Id. at 622, 837 P.2d at 1273.
Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Company, 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982) concerned
the traditional gathering rights of ahupua'a tenants. Kalipi asserted certain gathering
rights enumerated in HAW. REv. STAT. § 7-1. To exercise these rights the court found
that three conditions must be met: (1) the tenant must physically reside within the
ahupua'a where the activity will be undertaken; (2) the activity must only take place
upon undeveloped lands of the ahupua'a; and (3) the activity must entail the practice
of Native Hawaiian customs and traditions. Id. at 7-8, 656 P.2d at 745-50.
Concerning Kalipi's initial requirement of physical residence within the ahupua'a,
Pele recognized that access and gathering rights sometimes "extended beyond the
boundaries of the ahupua'a .... Pele, 73 Haw. at 620, 837 P.2d at 1271. Pele
modified this requirement by holding that "native Hawaiian rights protected by article
XII, section 7 may extend beyond the ahupua'a in which a native Hawaiian resides
where such rights have been customarily and traditionally exercised in this manner."
Id.
The Hawai'i Intermediate Court of Appeals addressed Pele's extension of Kalipi in
the agency decisionmaking setting. Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County
Planning Commission, 1993 W.L. 15605, 1993 Haw. App. LEXIS 2 (Haw. App.
Jan. 28, 1993 (No. 15460) (PASH). PASH involved the proposed development of a
resort complex. The ICA held that "in light of article XII, section 7,. . .all government
agencies undertaking or approving development of undeveloped land are required to
determine if native Hawaiian gathering rights have been customarily and traditionally
practiced on the land in question and explore possibilities for preserving them." 1993
W.L. 15605 at 6. Certiorari to the Hawai'i Supreme Court has been granted.
180 See supra Part III. Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as part of the post-Civil
War Reconstruction package of legal reforms. Section 1983 was designed to protect
African Americans from racist attacks under color of state law. The law has since
been broadened to permit suit against state officials for actions taken under color of
state law that violate an individual's federally protected rights, whether constitutional
or statutory. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). Moreover,
the actions violative of federal rights can be undertaken by officials of all branches of
government. "The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between
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declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1983 for the alleged
violations of the § 5(f) trust. 181
The Hawai'i Supreme Court in Pele first acknowledged plaintiffs'
right to assert a substantive federal civil rights claim in state court
against state officials acting in their official capacities and to prospec-
tively enjoin alleged violations of § 5(f).18 2 The court also found
appropriate injury suffered by PDF to confer standing. Specifically,
the court addressed PDF's standing to bring the suit as "representa-
tives" of beneficiaries of the Ceded Lands trust, indicating expansively
that its analysis would apply equally to beneficiaries of the Homelands
trust. 3 The court engaged in two lines of analysis. First, it drew upon
Hawai'i standing cases involving members of the public seeking to
enforce "rights of the public generally.' ' 8 4 "The court found that PDF
met the "injury in fact" test since PDF "members [w]ere beneficiaries
of the public trust who [had] been economically and/or aesthetically
injured by a transfer of trust lands in contravention of trust terms;8 5
the "injuries [could be traced] to the alleged breach of trust;"'8 6 and
the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal right-to protect the
people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be
executive, legislative, or judicial."' Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)
(citing Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
"I Pet, 73 Haw. at 590, 837 P.2d at 1256.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 592 n. 8 and 604 n. 18, 837 P.2d at 1257 n. 8 and 1263-64 n. 18.
84 Id. at 593, 837 P.2d at 1257.
181 Id. at 594, 837 P.2d at 1258, (citing Akau v. Olohana Corp., 65 Haw. 383, at
388-89, 652 P.2d 1130, at 1134 (1982)). A plaintiff has been injured in fact when she
"has suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant's wrongful
conduct, . . . the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions, and ... a
favorable decision would likely provide relief for plaintiff's injury." Pelte, 73 Haw. at
593, 837 P.2d at 1257. In Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276,
768 P.2d 1293 (1989), the Hawai'i Supreme Court found that Hawaii's Thousand
Friends (HTF) lacked standing. The injuries sustained were not similarly suffered by
the group as a whole. Individual members of HTF "would have relied differently on
the alleged misrepresentation and would have suffered different injuries, necessitating
different remedies." Pet, 73 Haw. at 593, 837 P.2d at 1258 (citing Hawaii's Thousand
Friends). Pelte indicated that PDF's standing depended upon whether the injury alleged
was suffered by the group in general or was personalized such that other group
members suffered different injuries requiring different remedies. The court viewed the
alleged § 5(f) breaches as "'generalized' injuries for which relief granted to the
organization would provide a remedy to any individual member." Pelte, 73 Haw. at
594, 837 P.2d at 1258.
186 Id.
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"the requested relief would be likely to remedy the injuries by giving
beneficial use of the exchanged land to trust beneficiaries. "187
The court also undertook a second line of analysis. It briefly, and
perhaps more significantly, discussed PDF's standing according to
public trust principles citing Kapiolani Park Preservation Society v. City &
County of Honolulu.18 Pele concluded that, "unless members of the public
and native Hawaiians, as beneficiaries of the trust, have standing, the
State would be free to dispose of the trust res without the citizens of
the State having any recourse." 18 9 This statement was perhaps the
necessary prelude to the court's subsequent declaration, discussed later,
that Article XII, S 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution creates a private
right of action in state court for breach of the ceded lands trust.
Pele thus acknowledged PDF's federal section 1983 right of action in
state court and recognized PDF's standing to sue. The court, without
considering the merits, then deemed applicable a two-year statute
limitations (rather than a six-year statute) and found PDF's section
1983 claim time-barred.190
The court also located other procedural grounds for dismissal. It
found that PDF had "a full and fair opportunity to litigate the.relevant
[sovereign immunity] issues"' 91 in the earlier federal court action and
187 Id. The court also found that a "multiplicity of suits" would be avoided by
allowing PDF to proceed.
1" 69 Haw. 569, 751 P.2d 1022 (1988). In Kapiolani Park, the City and County
attempted to lease a portion of the park for a restaurant. The private Preservation
Society sued the City and County as trustee of the charitable public trust owning the
underlying fee interest, claiming that the lease was not permitted under the terms of
the trust. Addressing the standing issue, the court intimated that the suit should have
been brought by the Attorney General as parens patriae. The Attorney General,
however, supported the City's action. The court held that the Preservation Society,
comprised of neighbors and users of the park, had standing to bring the suit since
"the citizens of this State would be left without protection, or a remedy, unless ...
members of the public, as beneficiaries of the trust, have standing to bring the matter
to the attention of the court." 69 Haw. at 572, 751 P.2d at 1025.
I" Pele, 73 Haw. at 594, 837 P.2d at 1258. The Intermediate Court of Appeals in
PASH, 1993 W.L. 15605, 1993 Haw. App. LEXIS 2 (Haw. App. Jan. 28, 1993,
following Pele's discussion of standing to sue, agreed that "Hawaii's state courts should
provide a forum for cases raising issues of broad public interest [such as the rights of
native Hawaiians], and that the judicially imposed standing barriers should be lowered
when the 'needs of justice.' would be best served by allowing a plaintiff to bring
claims before the court." 73 Haw. at 614, 837 P.2d at 1268-69.
190 Pele, 73 Haw. at 595, 837 P.2d at 1259.
19, Id. at 600-601, 837 P.2d at 1261.
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that res judicata barred PDF "from asserting its breach of section 5(0
trust and Fourteenth Amendment [federal] claims brought under section
1983."192 The court noted that PDF could not "escape the preclusive
effect of the Ninth Circuit's [sovereign immunity] ruling by advancing
a different remedial theory;" 1 9 any alternative theories merged with
PDF's originally asserted theories. 94
2. Breach of Trust Claims Under The Hawai'i Constitution: State law
claims in state court
Most important, Pele recognized a second, and distinct, PDF breach
of trust claim rooted entirely in state law. That claim can be leveled
directly against the State. The State's fiduciary obligations as trustee
of the public lands trust are delineated in Article XII, § 4 of the
Hawai'i Constitution. The Constitution in § 7 of Article XVI also
"mandates that the [f] 5(o trust provisions 'shall be complied with by
appropriate legislation[.]' '1 9 5 These constitutional provisions provided
the foundation for the Hawai'i Supreme Court's declaration, in a
finely-crafted, visionary section of its opinion, that "PDF has a right
to bring suit under the Hawai 'i Constitution to prospectively enjoin
the State from violating the terms of the ceded lands trust. "196
a. Right to sue under the Hawai'i Constitution
The court determined, contrary to the State's assertion, that an
implied private state law right of action exists under the Hawai'i
Constitution to enforce the State's § 5(f) trust obligations, notwithstand-
ing the Ninth Circuit's decision that no implied private federal law right
192 Id. The court rejected PDF's argument that resjudicata was inapplicable because
the Ninth Circuit in Ulaleo failed to address the merits of its breach of trust claims.
73 Haw. at 600, 837 P.2d at 1261. The Ninth Circuit in Ulaleo premised its dismissal
on Eleventh Amendment grounds-that PDF sought impermissible retrospective relief
for its section 1983 claims. Pele held that this Ninth Circuit finding concerning immunity
from suit precluded relitigation of the same federal claim in state court. Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 600, 837 P.2d at 1261. The Court cited Bolte v. Aits, Inc., 60 Haw. 58,
60, 587 P.2d 810, 812 (1978) as authority for prohibiting "splitting a cause of action
... or an entire claim either as to the theory of recovery or the specific relief
demanded." Pele, 73 Haw. at 600, 837 P.2d at 1261.
195 Id. at 601, 837 P.2d at 1262.
196 Id.
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of action emanates from the federal Admissions Act. 197 Pele, citing
several cases, 198 held that Hawai'i courts are "not precluded from
finding that the Hawai'i Constitution affords greater protection than
required by similar federal constitutional or statutory provisions." 1 99
The court, therefore, declared that the Ninth Circuit's Keaukaha 1 200
decision, finding no implied private right emanating from the federal
Admissions Act, did not preclude the Hawai'i Supreme Court from
finding such a right under state law. 2°, While Keaukaha I's articulated
reasons for finding no private federal right "were compelling in the
context of the enforceability of a federal statute, they do not support
a similar finding with respect to the enforcement of article XII, § 4 of
the Hawai'i Constitution."2 0 2
The Hawai'i Supreme Court observed that Article XII, S 4 was
added to the state constitution specifically to recognize the S 5(f) trust
and the State's obligations under the trust. Despite the Ninth Circuit's
"findings that no purpose would be served by allowing private enforce-
ment of the Ceded Lands trust in federal court, . . . protecting the res
of the public lands trust, thereby enforcing the mandates of our
constitution, is appropriate in our state courts. ''203 The court thus
recognized a state law right to sue to protect the corpus of the trust
and the beneficiaries' interest in it.
In this respect, Pele is a landmark decision. It recognized a state law
claim for State breaches of the S 5(f) Ceded Lands trust, and it did
so without transforming Native Hawaiian claims into civil rights claims.
With bracing clarity, the Hawai'i Supreme Court announced that it
"I Id. at 601-603, 837 P.2d at 1262-63. The court carefully limited this determi-
nation, observing that a private right of action in state court did not constitute "a
waiver of sovereign immunity such that money damages are available." Id. at 605,
837 P.2d at 1264.
198 Id. at 601, 837 P.2d. at 1262, (citing State v. Kam, 69 Haw. 483, 748 P.2d 372
(1988); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Lyman, 68 Haw. 55, 704 P.2d 888 (1985); State
v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985); and State v. Russo, 67 Haw. 126,
681 P.2d 553 (1984), appeal after remand, 69 Haw. 72, 734 P.2d 156 (1987)).
9 Pelte, 73 Haw. at 601, 837 P.2d at 1262.
21 Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Association v. Hawaiian Homes Commission,
588 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1978).
201 Id. at 1224.
202 Pelte, 73 Haw. at 603, 837 P.2d at 1263.
203 Id. Cf Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154,
737 P.2d 446 (1987) (political question doctrine bars claim concerning Office of
Hawaiian Affairs' allocation of Ceded Lands revenues).
1994 / RIGHT TO SUE
"will not leave the people of Hawai'i without the means to hold" the
State to its "fiduciary duties and obligations as trustee. "204 Implicit in
its pronouncement was the court's recognition that state courts should
be accessible to Native Hawaiians seeking to reconfigure socio-legal
narratives about their historical and contemporary situations and to
obtain redress for specific land trust breaches by the State.1
0 5
Pele is additionally significant because its right to sue holding con-
cerning the Ceded Lands trust applies equally to Native Hawaiian
claims for breach of the Hawaiian Homelands trust and because it
expansively defined the fiduciary duties of the State as trustee. In Price
11,06 the Ninth Circuit held that in a federal court section 1983 action
concerning the § 5(f) Ceded Lands trust, the State as trustee would
not be held to the same high fiduciary standard applicable to private
trustees. 07 Pele, however, relying on the Hawai'i Supreme Court's
decision in Ahuna v. Department of Hawaiian Home Lands,20 held differ-
ently. In state court, on a state law claim, the high fiduciary standards
of a private trustee apply to the State as trustee for both the Homelands
and Ceded Lands trusts.0 9
2'4 Pele, 73 Haw. at 601, 837 P.2d. at 1261-62. Homelands Trust beneficiaries first
exercised the right to sue for trust breaches under the Hawaii Constitution in Ka'ai'ai
v. Drake. See infra note 292.
205 As discussed in Part 2, supra, later in the Pele opinion, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court apparently substantially closed the door it opened with its implied right of action
analysis, adopting what appears to be a restrictive sovereign immunity frame of
analysis.
206 Price v. State, 921 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1990) (Price II).
207 The Ninth Circuit in Price II observed that it was "the apparent decision by the
parties involved in the [Admissions] Act that the State and its officials would proceed
with a certain degree of good faith and need not be held to strict trust administration
standards." Id. at 956. The court also cited concern about unnecessary federal
involvement in "the micro management of the government of the State." Id.
200 64 Haw. 327, 640 P.2d 1161 (1982).
201 64 Haw. 327, 339 (1982), cited in Pele, 73 Haw. at 604-605 n.18, 837 P.2d at
1263-64 n.18. Ahuna addressed the extent of the fiduciary duty owed by the trustees
of the Hawaiian Homelands to beneficiaries of that trust. The Ahuna court held the
government trustees to "the same strict standards applicable to private trustees."
Ahuna, 64 Haw. at 339, 640 P.2d at 1169. This entailed administering the trust solely
in the interest of the beneficiaries, using reasonable skill and care to make trust
property productive, and acting as an ordinary and prudent person would in dealing
with his or her own property. Id. at 340, 640 P.2d at 1169. (Ahuna did not address
the threshold issue of whether trust beneficiaries had a right to sue to enforce the
trustee's fiduciary obligations. It found that the defendants waived any no-right-to-sue
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Pele's recognition of a state law right to sue under the Hawai'i
Constitution, and its expansive definition of the trustee's fiduciary
duties, promise future state court actions for state breaches of the
Ceded Lands and Homelands trusts. Equally significant, they promise
an evolving role of state courts in the adjudication of Native Hawaiian
land claims-not only in accepting and maintaining breach of trust
claims, but also in acknowledging socio-historical context and recog-
nizing customary and contemporary cultural practices and values and
possibly international law norms to inform, and transform, traditional
trust law principles.
b. Sovereign Immunity
This promise, however, appears to be partially undermined by Pele's
adoption of federal Eleventh Amendment immunity principles as the
foundation of its sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Those principles,
in practical effect, sharply limit court access in many instances. Pele
described in general terms the current status of sovereign immunity in
Hawai'i's courts. The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suit against
the State for money damages "except where there has been a 'clear
relinquishment' of immunity and the State has consented to be sued."1 10
This immunity cannot be invoked, however, if the suit seeks only to
enjoin state executive department officials from violating either the
State constitution or State statutes." In light of the Hawai'i Supreme
defense by failing to assert it before the lower court. Id. at 333, 640 P.2d at 1065).
Pele's application of Ahuna to define trustee duties for the Ceded Lands trust was
consistent with rulings concerning other native peoples' land trusts. See Plateau Mining
Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 728-29 (Utah 1990)
("State acts as a trustee and its duties are the same as the duties of other trustees");
Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 331-39 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 1032 (1988); Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 235-36 (Okla.
1982).
'10 Pele, 73 Haw. at 607, 837 P.2d at 1265.
211 Id. Pele quoted from W. H. Greenwell, Ltd. v. Dept. of Land and Natural
Resources, 50 Haw. 207, 208-09, 436 P.2d 527 (1968):
It is the unquestioned rule that the State cannot be sued without its consent
[... ] in matters "involving the enforcement of contracts, treasury liability for
tort, and the adjudication of interest [sic] in property [ .... ]" [However,]
sovereign immunity may not be invoked as a defense by state officials who comprise an
executive department of government when their action is attacked as being unconstitutional.
Pele, 73 Haw. at 607, 837 P.2d at 1265 (emphasis added). Pele continued, "[N]or will
sovereign immunity bar suits to enjoin state officials from violating state statutes."
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Court decisions so limiting the State's sovereign immunity, PDF's state
law breach of trust claim solely for injunctive and declaratory relief
against BLNR officials seemed unproblematic. The Hawai'i Supreme
Court in Pele, however, refined, or arguably reconstructed, the State
sovereign immunity doctrine in cases requesting injunctive and declar-
atory relief.
First, the court in Pele acknowledged that "[t]his court has not
previously tested the scope" of the sovereign immunity doctrine or its
exceptions.2"2 Significantly, the court did not address whether the state
waived its immunity from breach of trust suits by accepting primary
responsibility for the Homelands and Ceded Lands trusts as a condition
of Statehood and by incorporating that responsibility into the State
Constitution. 13 The court instead focused implicitly on when an in-
junctive relief suit against state officials would in effect be an imper-
missible damages suit against the State in disguise. This raised an
issue of state law. The court adopted the federal case Ex Parte Young21 4
as "relevant" authority on state sovereign immunity, observing that
"the Eleventh Amendment is the federal constitutional embracement
of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.' '215 Young held
212 Pete, 73 Haw. at 608, 837 P.2d at 1265-66.
10 This appears to be the initial sovereign immunity issue in Pelte. See generally
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224-26 (1983) (the United States trust
obligation to the Quimult Tribe arose implicitly out of a federal timber management
statute and the Tribe could recover damages from the United States for breach of its
fiduciary duty in mismanaging trust lands and resources); c.f. Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) ("a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied
but must be unequivocally expressed").
2- 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Young, the attorney general of Minnesota was enjoined
from enforcing a state statute prescribing certain railroad rates. The attorney general
unsuccessfully argued that the federal Circuit Court (now district court) had no
jurisdiction over him because the suit was in effect a suit against the State, and thus
contrary to the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 132. Pee cited Young explicitly. Pet, 73
Haw. at 608-609, 837 P.2d at 1266. It also quoted from W. H. Greenwell, Ltd. v.
Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 50 Haw. 207, 436 P.2d 527 (1968) which also
cited Young. Greenwell, however, did not discuss Young or why the Hawai'i Supreme
Court would be citing a federal court Eleventh Amendment case in a state court action
to which the Eleventh Amendment did not apply.
215 Pelte, 73 Haw. at 606, 837 P.2d at 1264. The meaning of Pelte's statement
concerning the "federal constitutional embracement of the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity" is uncertain. Pelte cited Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989), in support of that statement, partially paraphrasing and partially
quoting from Will (the paraphrased portion is italicized, the quoted portion is in
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 16.1
that the Eleventh Amendment 16 does not bar certain federal suits to
quotations):
In discussing whether Congress intended to abrogate eleventh amendment immunities in S
1983 actions, the [Will] Court stated that "members of the 42d Congress were
familiar with common-law principles. . . [and t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity
was a familiar doctrine at common law."
Pele, 73 Haw. at 606-607, 837 P.2d at 1265. Pele's paraphrased statement concerning
Will slightly but importantly alters the meaning of the quoted passage from Will. The
language in Will immediately preceding the language quoted by Pele indicates that the
Will opinion was not at that juncture addressing "whether Congress intended to
abrogate eleventh amendment immunities in § 1983 actions," nor was it addressing
whether the "eleventh amendment is the federal constitutional embracement of the
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . [made] applicable to the federal
courts." Instead that passage in Will was addressing whether the Congressional
enactment of 5 1983 abrogated common-law immunities (as distinguished from Eleventh
Amendment constitutional immunities). The passage from Will in its entirety reads:
[Il]n enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or
defenses under common law. 'One important assumption underlying the Court's
decisions in this area is that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with
common-law principles, including defenses previously recognized in ordinary tort
litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent
specific provisions to the contrary.'
Will, 491 U.S. at 67 [emphasis added]. This passage does not indicate support for
the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment reflects federal constitutional incorpo-
ration of common law sovereign immunity principles.
I6 The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
The amendment was adopted in reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793). Chisolm hacq allowed the citizen of one state to invoke the federal court's
diversity jurisdiction to sue a different state on a state law claim. As the literal wording
of the amendment reveals, the amendment was directly aimed at precluding such
exercises of diversity jurisdiction. See William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation Of
The Eleventh Amendment: A Reply To Critics, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (1989);
Lawrence C. Marshall, The Diversity Theory Of The Eleventh Amendment: A Critical
Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1375-78 (1989).
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (Hans) recast the literal meaning of the
amendment and barred a citizen's suit against her own state in federal court. The
Supreme Court in Hans located in the amendment a "broad policy against suing states
in federal court." Id. George D. Brown, Has The Supreme Court Confessed Error On The
Eleventh Amendment? Revisionist Scholarship And State Immunity, 68 N.CAROLINA L. REV.
867, 872 (1990). Hans thus effectively viewed the Eleventh Amendment as providing
sweeping sovereign immunity protection for states in federal court. See William P.
Marshall, The Eleventh Amendment, Process Federalism And The Clear Statement Rule, 39
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enjoin as unconstitutional a state official'& actions. 21 ' Federal cases
following Young distinguished permissible from impermissible suits by
constructing a dividing line between cases requesting prospective relief
and cases requesting retrospective relief. Prospective relief against a
state official in federal court is permissible even if the relief is accom-
panied by a "substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury.' '28 If,
however, the relief is "tantamount to an award of damages for a past
violation" of law, the relief is retrospective and the [federal] suit is
barred. 219
Pele then looked to a more recent United States Supreme Court case
for guidance on the meaning of "retrospective injunctive" relief. In
Papasan v. Allain,220 the federal government had granted lands to the
State of Mississippi to be held in trust for the benefit of public schools.
The lands set aside for the school district at issue in Papasan had been
sold and the proceeds invested in railroads. When the railroads were
destroyed during the Civil War and the investment permanently lost,
Mississippi compensated the school district with "interest" on the lost
DEPAUL L. REv. 345, 350 (1989). The Hans decision continues to be roundly criticized
for its illiteral reading of the constitution and the "doctrinal gymnastics and legal
fictions" it has spawned. Brown, 68 N. CAROLINA L. REV. at 873; Vicki C. Jackson,
The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, And State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L. J 1
(1988) ("For over a decade, Eleventh Amendment scholarship has sought to demon-
strate that the amendment cannot be regarded historically or textually as embodying
the doctrines of immunity attributed to it. That task has been substantially accom-
plished." Id. at 72). See also Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468
(1987); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1983) (strong minority opinions
calling for rejection" of Hans).
Despite the general doctrinal confusion and scholarly and judicial dissatisfaction,
two alternative theories continue to be viewed as informing the amendment. These
two theories are the diversity jurisdiction theory, emanating from the reaction to
Chisolm, and the sovereign immunity, theory emanating from Hans. Both theories
are rooted in federalism concerns. The limited "ability of federal courts to hear suits
against state governments [is an issue] crucial to defining the content of American
federalism." Erwin Chemerinsky, Congress, The Supreme Court And The Eleventh Amend-
ment: A Comment On The Decisions During The 1988-89 Term, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 321-
322 (1989).
217 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 130.
28 Pele, 73 Haw. at 609 n. 22, 837 P.2d at 1266 n. 22 and accompanying text
(quoting B. H. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1985), and citing Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974)).
2,9 Pele, 73 Haw. at 609-10, 837 P.2d at 1266, (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278).
220 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
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principal acquired from the sale of the trust lands. The amount paid
to the school district was grossly inadequate in light of the value of
intact trust lands in other school districts. 221 The plaintiffs, school
officials and children from the affected school district, sued the State
requesting injunctive relief-namely restoration of the lost trust corpus
through establishment of a trust fund to pay income to, or designation
of trust lands for use by, the plaintiffs.
222
The United States Supreme Court in Papasan, relying on Young,
observed that federal court relief against state officials is limited by the
Eleventh Amendment. The exercise of federal judicial power over state
officials is permissible only where the "violation of federal law by a
state official is ongoing as opposed to cases in which federal law has
been violated at one time or over a period of time in the past. 22 3 The
Court then held that plaintiffs' requested relief amounted to a monetary
award for a past breach, and "discern[ed] no substantive difference
between a not-yet-extinguished liability for a past breach of trust and
the continuing obligation to meet trust responsibilities asserted by the
petitioners.' '224
After examining both Young and Papasan, the Pele court turned to
the particular claims before it. It determined that PDF's request that
the Ceded Land be restored by means of a constructive trust upon
property held by private party Campbell was 'essentially equivalent'
to a nullification of the exchange and the return of the exchanged
lands to the trust res. ' ' 221 The "effect on the state treasury would be
• . .unavoidable," and PDF's requested relief was "in effect, a request
for compensation for the past actions of the BLNR members. ' 226 All
PDF's claims premised on state constitutional or statutory grounds
were thus deemed "retrospective" and barred by the State's sovereign
immunity as defined by federal Eleventh Amendment principles.
This aspect of Pele is troublesome. As Pele recognized, the Eleventh
Amendment to the United State's Constitution does not apply in state
courts.2 17 The purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to prevent federal
courts from adjudicating claims against states, particularly claims rooted
221, Id. at 272-73.
222 Id. at 274-75.
222 Id. at 277-78.
224 Id. at 281.
225 Pele, 73 Haw. at 611, 837 P.2d at 1267.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 608 n.20, 837 P.2d at 1265, n.20.
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in state law.228 Federalism concepts provide the foundation: federal
courts should not be telling states how to order their affairs according
to state law. 229 The Eleventh Amendment thus confers upon states a
special and limited type of federal court immunity that is rooted in
federal law in light of an accommodation of federal and state prero-
gatives.230
Pele deemed Eleventh Amendment immunity strictures "relevant"
to its state law analysis of state immunity in state court on state law
claims22 ' and "adopted" the Eleventh Amendment rule in Young con-
cerning a limited "exception" to state immunity. 212 By deeming Elev-
enth Amendment immunity strictures relevant and by adopting the
rule in Young, Pele embraced federal Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
for the purpose of redefining or at least refining state officials' immunity
from state law injunctive relief suits in state court.
The court's effort in Pele at demarcating limits to state liability is
understandable as a general matter. Indeed, the court's approach may
have been constrained by the absence of clear state constitutional or
legislative guidance on the scope of the State's immunity from Native
Hawaiian breach of trust suits. 233 Pele's transposition of federal Eleventh
Amendment principles nevertheless is problematic for specific reasons.
First, Eleventh Amendment principles generally, and the Young line of
cases particularly, are acknowledged to be "complex, confusing and
often inconsistent.' '234
228 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
229 Professor Chemerinsky observes that the Eleventh Amendment "bears directly
on federalism, separation of powers, and the protection of fundamental rights. Specif-
ically, because it determines the ability of federal courts to hear suits against state
governments, the eleventh amendment is crucial to defining the content of American
federalism." Chemerinsky, supra note 216, at 322.
230 See supra note 216, discussing the diversity jurisdiction and sovereign immunity
theories of the Eleventh Amendment and the federalism concerns underlying both
theories.
231 Pele, 73 Haw. at 606, 837 P.2d at 1264.
212 Id. at 609, 837 P.2d at 1266.
223 See infra Part V(A).
234 Brown, supra note 216, at 873 (describing common perceptions of Eleventh
Amendment doctrine, in part due to the uncertainties and fictions generated by
Young.); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment And State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (1983) ("a hodgepodge of confusing
and intellectually indefensible judge-made law." Id. at 1891); William A. Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation Of The Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction Of An Affirmation
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Second, Pele shielded the State from a range of state law breach of
trust suits in state court by employing federal law sovereign immunity
principles that are shaped by federalism concerns. 235 Plaintiffs' state
law breach of trust claim in Pele did not implicate federalism concerns.
Plaintiffs asserted their second claim in state court against state officials
on the basis of state law. 236 There existed no federalism justification
for the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity principles to
limit that claim. 237 Pele's sovereign immunity ruling therefore needed
to be justified on some other ground. 238
Grant Of Jurisdiction Rather Than A Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN L. REV. 1033,
1044 (1983) ("a complicated, jerry-built system that is fully understood only by those
who specialize in this difficult field." Id. at 1044); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty
And Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1480 (1987).
I" See supra notes 215-216, 230 and accompanying text.
236 The Pele plaintiffs' initial state court claim, not the focus of discussion in this
section, was a federal section 1983 breach of trust claim, which the court dismissed
on res judicata grounds. The court did not undertake, or need to undertake, rigorous
Eleventh Amendment analysis in light of its conclusion that the res judicata doctrine
barred that claim. Some discussion here of Eleventh Amendment analysis in state
court section 1983 suits, however, is relevant. As indicated, the Eleventh Amendment's
purpose is to prevent federal courts from adjudicating claims against states-a feder-
alism concern. Where a federal section 1983 claim is asserted in state court, as with
the Pele plaintiff's initial claim, the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable. Its federalism
concerns, however, may continue to guide the state court. See Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). The state court must still determine if the
defendant state officials are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983, and that
determination is generally informed by Eleventh Amendment analysis. Id. (cited in
the Pele opinion, 73 Haw. at 608 n.20, 837 P.2d at 1265 n.20, for the proposition
that, "Noting that the eleventh amendment does not apply in state courts, the United
States Supreme Court [in Will] addressed the question of whether a state is a "person"
under section 1983").
117 An exception to a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal court suit
exists where the court in a federal section 1983 action is enjoining state officials'
violations of plaintiffs' federal rights. "The federal courts are [in that instance]
primarily concerned with vindicating federal rights and holding state officials responsible
to the supreme authority of the United States." Pele, 73 Haw. at 609, n.21, 837 P.2d
at 1266, n.21. The supremacy of federal law is vindicated in that setting through the
court's injunctive relief order without upsetting the delicate balance of federal and
state authority contemplated by our dual system of governance.
That delicate balance of federal and state power is not implicated by the Pele
plaintiffs' state law breach of trust claim. That claim was brought in state court,
against state officials, according to state rights emanating from the state constitution
and statutes.
138 Some speculative reasons might have included the opening of floodgates to de
facto damage suits, the public cost of defending numerous injunctive relief suits, a
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Pele's reliance upon Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is problem-
atic for a third related reason. Pele, in effect, adopted the federal courts'
limited exception to Eleventh Amendment state immunity based on
Young, Papasan and Ulaleo, the federal cases discussed earlier.23 9 The
prospective/retrospective relief distinction drawn by those cases has
been sharply criticized by many commentators.2 4 As mentioned earlier,
those cases can be, and have been, restrictively construed to define
narrowly the scope of the immunity exception-only allowing suits that
seek to stop state officials from initiating or completing acts constituting
breaches of trust.2 41 Indeed, Papasan, which Pele relied upon, observed
that permissible prospective relief focused on law violations that are
"ongoing as opposed to cases in which . . . law has been violated at
one time or over a period of time in the past. "2142
judicial order's potential undue disruption of executive branch operations, the existence
of alternative legislatively-mandated avenues of legal redress-all implicating in one
form or another concern about the separation of powers among the state branches of
government.
239 See supra notes 171-72, 178, 192, 220-26 and accompanying text.
240 Professor Jackson addresses the "much-criticized distinction" between prospective
and retrospective relief.
The distinction . . . has been criticized on numerous grounds. First, it is
unsupported by the language of the Eleventh Amendment, which does not
distinguish between legal and equitable relief. Second, prospective relief requiring
future payments can burden the state as much as past due monetary awards.
Third, the Edelman distinction is unclear whether it is the compensatory purpose
of the relief that is to be condemned (which might permit, for example, punitive
monetary awards against the state) or whether it is any order to pay funds that
is problematic . . . If both elements are required to render the relief prohibited,
why does the conjunction of compensation and monetary awards make those
cases "against the state" more than others? Finally, some have criticized the
distinction on the ground that the dividing line between the two forms of relief
is difficult to draw and has not been drawn consistently by the Court.
Jackson, supra note 216, at 88 n.353. See also Amar, supra note 234, at 1478 (the
distinction rests on "doctrinal gymnastics and legal fictions"); William Burnham,
Federal Court Remedies For Past Misconduct By State Officials: Notice Relief And The Legacy
Of Quern v. Jordan, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 74 (1984); David P. Currie, Sovereign
Immunity And Suits Against Government Officers, 1984 Sup. CT. Rev. 149, 160-61; Norman
B. Lichtenstein, Retroactive Relief In The Federal Courts Since Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip
Through The Twilight Zone, 32 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 364 (1982).
241 See Brown, supra note 216, at 873-74 ("One view [of Young and its progeny in
context of overall eleventh amendment analysis] is that the results are simply wrong,
that the states get too much immunity. Another view emphasizes the danger of the
judiciary's undermining its own legitimacy by 'formal adherence to a doctrine riddled
with exceptions designed to counterbalance its evils' (footnotes omitted)).
242 B. H. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, at 277-78.
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Pele acknowledged that the test for retrospectiveness of relief is
whether the remedy "would amount to virtual compensation for the
past misconduct of state officials" and found that "the effect on the
state treasury would be direct and unavoidable, rather than ancillary,
because imposing a constructive trust on lands now held by Campbell
would require that the State to [sic] compensate Campbell for its
property."2 4 3 This language indicates focus upon whether the requested
injunction would require substantial expenditures of state funds such
that the injunctive relief would actually be monetary compensation in
disguise. This focus, however, is rendered uncertain by language in
Papasan and Ulaleo and by the Pele court's minimally-explained finding
that the state treasury would be directly and unavoidably affected by
a nullification or a constructive trust remedy. Consider the following
view. If the exchange were nullified, both Campbell and the State
would "reacquire their original properties" 24 4-a remedy that would
not impact on the State treasury. (A separate question would arise as
to the improvements.) If a constructive trust were imposed, and the
State in effect reacquired the Ceded Lands, the State temporarily would
have the return of the Ceded Lands plus the land originally conveyed
by Campbell. The State could thus (1) return Campbell's original
property, or (2) exchange other state-owned non-Ceded Land property
of equivalent value. Whichever option the State selected, the net cost
to the State would appear to be zero. Any related state expenses would
fall within what Papasan classified as permissible ancillary costs. PDF's
requested relief could thus be viewed as not constituting "virtual
[monetary] compensation." 245
If this view is at least plausible, then Pele did not in actuality focus
on the "impact on state treasury," and its emphasis on the "past"
nature of the state officials' action becomes determinative- "PDF is
not seeking prospectively to enjoin a constitutional violation in this
case, but would have us turn back the clock and examine actions
already taken by the state.' '246
The Hawai'i federal district court in Han v. Department of Justice
recently adopted just such a restrictive reading of Pele in dismissing
Native Hawaiian breach of trust claims for past administrative acts
even though the remedy sought would not have impacted upon the
23 Pele, 73 Haw. at 610-11, 837 P.2d at 1267.
2*4 Id. at 611, 837 P.2d at 1267.
245 Id. at 610, 837 P.2d at 1266.
24 Id. at 601, 837 P.2d at 1262.
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State treasury.2 47 In dismissing the plaintiffs' injunctive relief claims
against State officials, the district court emphasized the timing-of-breach
and not the impact-on-treasury. The court found "all [plaintiffs' alle-
gations against the State officials look to remedy the past problem of
authorizing [third-party leases] with non-native Hawaiians. ' 2"8 The
court then cited Pele for the proposition that plaintiffs cannot "have us
turn back the clock and examine actions already taken by the state.
249
The injunctive and declaratory relief sought in Han involved, among
other things, the invalidation of the Hawaiian Homes Commission's
approval of Homelands awardees' subleases of their lots to non-Ha-
waiians. Significantly, a remedy of invalidation simply would have
nullified the subleases. It would not have entailed any payment from
the State treasury. The federal district court nevertheless relied upon
the "past" breach language in Pele, and found the requested relief
impermissibly retrospective, apparently focusing entirely on the fact
that the challenged actions were past in the past.
250
From this restrictive view, once the breaching acts are completed,
the relief sought, in whatever form, will likely be deemed retrospective
and therefore impermissible, despite continuing harm resulting from
the acts. In practical effect, since most ostensible trust breaches occur
through administrative agency decision-making, with limited notice,
few suits are likely to be researched, prepared, and filed before agency
action. .5
Hawai'i courts are not bound to follow this restrictive Eleventh
Amendment view. If they do, however, relatively few breach of trust
suits are likely to make it through state courthouse doors. 252 This
potential barrier to state courthouse entry is significant. In concert
with other procedural restrictions, it could preclude development and
241 824 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Haw. 1993).
219 Id. at 1488.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 1489.
25, Rule 11 of the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the signer of a
court filing certify that the filing is made after reasonable inquiry and is reasonably
supported by facts and is warranted by existing law or a plausible argument for change
in the law. HAw. R. Civ. P. 11. In light of the sanctions levied for Rule 11 violations
and due to the factual and legal complexity of many breach of Hawaiian land trusts
claims, the potentially high cost of litigation, the time needed for careful research,
investigation, consultation, and drafting, the filing of many breach of trust suits may
be precluded before agency action takes place.
252 See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.
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presentation a wide range of current state law breach of trust claims
which Pele earlier endorsed through its careful and path breaking
implied-right-of-action analysis under Article XII, §§ 2 and 4 of the
Hawai'i Constitution.253 The creation of such a process barrier would
seem to clash with Pele's over-arching statements about the necessity
of opening state courts for Native Hawaiians to enforce the State's
trust obligations. It would also sharply constrain state court cultural
performances. Indeed, the story that ultimately emerged in Pele muted
Native Hawaiian voices on the matters about which the speakers
appeared to care most, matters for them at the heart of the Ceded
Lands controversy-the historical and continuing spiritual and cultural
harm arising out of the desecration of sacred lands. In constraining
courts' cultural performances in this fashion, such a process barrier
would appear to undermine the court's movement toward reconcep-
tualizing the judicial function in the context of Native Hawaiian land
trust controversies. The uncertainty resulting from a range of doctrinal
interpretations- with widely varying potential social-cultural impacts-
leaves open the possibility of future clarifying judicial statements con-
cerning the apparent restrictiveness of Pele's sovereign immunity dis-
cussion.2"'
V. OTHER NATIVE HAWAIIAN STATE COURT BREACH OF TRUST
ACTIONS: THE APPARENT FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Pele's uncertainty is especially significant in light of the apparent
failure of the Native Hawaiian Trusts Judicial Relief Act.2 55 The Act
explicitly waives the State's sovereign immunity from Native Hawaiian
breach of trust suits. The Act, however, is peculiarly structured and
embodies severe procedural and substantive limitations. The Act's right
to sue provisions thus lie dormant-untried by Native Hawaiian liti-
gants and untested by the Hawai'i courts.
253 See supra Part IV(B)(2)(a).
254 Clarifying options might include: explicitly awaiting delineation of sovereign
immunity parameters via legislation or constitutional amendment; or, declaring that
sovereign immunity cannot be invoked if the suit seeks only to enjoin state officials
from violating either the State Constitution or statutes, regardless of whether the
official's acts are completed or on-going; or, declaring that sovereign immunity cannot
be invoked if the suit seeks "prospective" relief, meaning that the plaintiff requests
injunctive relief and the State fails to carry its burden of proving with specific facts
that the state treasury will be directly, substantially and quantifiably impacted.
255 Native Hawaiian Trusts Judicial Relief Act, HAW. REV. STAT. S 673 (1988).
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A. The Native Hawaiian Trusts Judicial Relief Act (H. R. S. chapter 673)
Amidst controversy, the 1988 Hawai'i legislature passed the Native
Hawaiian Trusts Judicial Relief Act.25 6 The Act offers Native Hawaiians
a limited right to sue the State in state court for breaches of its fiduciary
duties concerning both the Hawaiian Homelands and Ceded Lands
trusts.25 7 The Act bifurcates the State's waiver of immunity according
to two distinct time frames.
1. The right to sue for Homelands and Ceded Lands trust breaches
occurring after June 30, 1988
The Native Hawaiian Trusts Judicial Relief Act is codified in Chapter
673 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes. Chapter 673 consists of ten sections
defining the State's waiver of sovereign immunity. Chapter 673-1
provides that "[t]he State [of Hawaii] waives its immunity for any
breach of trust or fiduciary duty resulting from the acts or omissions
of its agents, officers and employees in the management and disposition
of trust funds and resources of" the Hawaiian Homelands and Ceded
Lands. This waiver, however, is temporally limited. The Chapter
authorizes suit only for claims accruing after June 30, 1988.258 The
waiver also is inapplicable to continuing violations of either trust which
first arose prior to July 1, 1988.259
Chapter 673 claims involving the Hawaiian Homelands trust may
be brought by Native Hawaiians as defined in § 201(a)(7) of the
2' The Native Hawaiian Trusts Judicial Relief Act was passed by the Hawaii
legislature in 1988 and is codified at HAW. REV. STAT. S 673 (1988). See Teruya, supra
note 37 at 890-91. See also, Hawaii's Ceded Lands, supra note 37 at 101.
In 1983 a federal-state task force examined the State's implementation of the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. It recommended that legislation be crafted to allow
beneficiaries access to courts. HAWAII ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A BROKEN TRUST; THE HAWAIIAN HOMELANDS PROGRAM:
SEVENTY YEARS OF FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT
THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS 8 (1991). See Teruya, supra note 37 at 891-
904 for a concise account of the historically significant social, political and legal events
and circumstances underlying the passage of the Act.
25, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 673-1 (1988).
28 Note, Section 3 following HAW. REV. STAT. Chapter 673 (1988).
25 Note, Section 4 following HAW. REV. STAT. Chapter 673 (1988) provides that
"[nlo action shall be maintained under this Act for any existing projects, programs,
or any other governmental activities which are continuing, and which were begun,
completed, or established prior to July 1, 1988."
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Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, Native Hawaiian organizations,
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, and those Hawaiians deemed eligible
to succeed to a homestead lease pursuant to 5 209 of the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act, as amended.2 60 Chapter 673 claims involving
the § 5(f) Ceded Lands trust may be brought by all of the above
described claimants except eligible successors to homestead lease.2 61 To
be deemed a beneficiary for purposes of both trusts and thereby accrue
a right to sue, a claimant must prove that she is of at least half
Hawaiian blood .262 Most Hawaiians do not satisfy this fifty percent
requirement.
Chapter 673 allows a claimant to file a breach of trust claim in state
circuit courts only after exhausting "all administrative remedies avail-
able .",263 The claimant must also, at least sixty days prior to filing a
claim, give written notice that unless "appropriate remedial action is
taken suit shall be filed.' '264 The notice and administrative exhaustion
requirements have generated uncertainty. Despite a clear statutory
mandate,2 65 the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands ("DHHL")
260 HAW. REV. STAT. 5 673-2(a) (1988). A Native Hawaiian is defined in section
201(a)(7) of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act as one with at least fifty percent
Hawaiian blood. An organization is eligible if its "purpose is to protect and uphold
the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and the Admissions Act section 5(f) . . .," and
is "controlled by native Hawaiians and a majority of its members receives or can
receive benefits from the trust." HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 673-2(c) (1988). A successor to
a homestead lease must be a spouse, child, grandchild, brother, sister, widow or
widower of a child, grandchild, or sibling, or niece, or nephew of the lessee and at
least one-quarter Hawaiian. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, § 209. As such,
Hawaiians not meeting the 50% blood quantum requirement are precluded from
asserting a breach of this trust except as an eligible successor or as a member of an
eligible organization. Section 201(a)(7)'s legal definition of "Native Hawaiian" is one
interpretation of the term. There are other definitions, albeit without current legal
force. These other definitions rest on "several criteria including race, self-identification,
genealogy, political considerations, culture, and geography." Friedman, supra note 37
at 522 n. 2.
26 Claims involving the Ceded Lands trust may be brought by the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs, Native Hawaiians as defined in section 10-2, and Native Hawaiian organi-
zations. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 673-2(b) (1988).
262 See supra note 260.
263 HAW. REV. STAT. SS 673-3 (1988).
264 HAW. REV. STAT. S 673-3 (1988).
265 HAW. REV. STAT. SS 673-3 provides, "All executive branch departments shall
adopt, in accordance with chapter 91, such rules as may be necessary to specify the
procedures for exhausting any remedies available." HAW. REV. STAT. S§ 673-3 (1988).
Chapter 91, The Administrative Procedure Act, establishes general administrative
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has thus far failed to promulgate administrative procedures for claim
initiation.2 66 It is therefore unclear whether a contested case hearing is
an available administrative remedy that must be "exhausted" as a
precondition to suit.1
6 1
All Chapter 673 claims are subject to a two year statute of limitations
period.2" The Chapter initially extended the limitations period for early
claims. It provided that the statute of limitations for claims accruing
between July 1, 1988 and July 1, 1990 would begin to run on July 1,
1990, meaning that those claims must have been filed by June 30,
1992.269
procedures one must exhaust prior to invoking circuit court jurisdiction. HAW. Ray.
STAT. Chapter 91.
26 One unofficial view is that the Department of Hawaiian Homelands' regular
contested case hearing procedures might be applicable. Under this view, beneficiaries
would be required to request a contested case hearing and file their claims with the
Department of Hawaiian Homelands. The Department would then investigate the
claim and submit a report and recommendation to the Hawaiian Homes Commission.
If the Commission deems the case ripe for consideration it will hear it. A recommended
decision would then be submitted to the Commission. An aggrieved party may then
request reconsideration of the Commission's decision or appeal a final decision of the
Commission to a circuit court. Id. See Teruya, supra note 37 at 906-07.
267 Hawaii's Administrative Procedure Act, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 91-14(a), provides
generally that redress in the circuit courts of the State may not be sought until a
claimant receives and is dissatisfied with "a final [administrative] decision and order
in a contested case or[,]" a claimant receives "a preliminary ruling of the nature that
deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent final decision would deprive appellant
of adequate relief." Id. In light of this procedural uncertainty claimants would appear
to be justified in filing their claims directly in the circuit courts after complying with
the sixty day notice requirement, but without seeking administrative contested case
disposition. DHHL's failure to-promulgate procedural rules promptly should not
jeopardize or postpone a claimant's right to judicial redress.
268 HAW. REV. STAT. SS 673-10 ("[e]very claim arising under this chapter shall
forever be barred unless the action is commenced within two years after the cause of
action accrues." HAW. REV. STAT. 5§ 673-10 (1988)).
169 The running of the limitations period is also tolled when the claim is filed with
the proper administrative agency and remains tolled until ninety days after a decision
is rendered. Id. Determining "when the cause of action accrues" is critical. The
Hawaii Supreme Court has determined that a tort action against the State accrues
when "the plaintiff knew or in the exercise or reasonable care should have discovered
that an actionable wrong has been committed." Waugh v. University of Hawaii, 63
Haw. 117, 127, 621 P.2d 957, 966 (1980). This tort action test will likely also be
used to determine whether one has timely filed an actionable claim for breach of the
State's fiduciary duty under both the Hawaiian Homelands and Ceded Lands trusts.
See Teruya, supra note 37, at 912-13, stating that a two year statute of limitations will
likely force the bringing of questionable claims, "deter" the pursuit of others and
"prevent the resolution of many individual claims." Id.
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Most important, Chapter 673 limits available remedies. Suits may
be initiated only to restore the trust corpus depleted by the wrongful
alienation or use of trust lands or funds,2 70 and to recover actual out-
of-pocket damages sustained by individual claimants.2 71 Chapter 673
does not authorize consequential damages, punitive damages, land
awards or injunctive relief.2 72
2. Negotiated settlements of Department of Hawaiian Homelands claims
against the state for state breaches of Homelands Trust from August 21, 1959
to June 30, 1988
Chapter 673 waived the State's immunity for breach of trust claims
against the State for the State's unauthorized use of Homelands between
August 21, 1959 and June 30, 1988. That waiver, however, only
became operative if the governor failed to resolve those claims against
the State in a timely fashion.2 73 Within the statutorily prescribed three
270 If such funds are recovered from the State they are transferred directly to the
Department of Hawaiian Home Lands. Individual plaintiffs only receive actual out of
pocket damages. The probable effect of this result is to provide plaintiffs with little
incentive to pursue their claims. HAW. REV. STAT. SS 673-4(a) and (b). This section
provides:
(a) In an action under this chapter the court may only award land or monetary
damages to restore the trust which has been depleted as a result of any breach
of trust duty and no award shall be made directly to or for the individual benefit
of any particular person not charged by law with the administration of the trust
property; provided that actual damages may be awarded to a successful plaintiff.
(b) "Actual damages,-" as used in this section, means direct, monetary, out of
pocket loss, excluding noneconomic damages as defined in section 663-8.5 and
any consequential damages, sustained by a native Hawaiian or Hawaiian indi-
vidually rather than the class generally.
HAW. REV. STAT. §5 673-4(a) and (b) (1988).
"' See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 673-4(a) and (b) (1988).
272 HAW. REV. STAT. § 673-1(a) and 673-4(a) and (b) (1988).
273 The Native Hawaiian Trusts Judicial Relief Act 395, subsections 3-5, 14th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 HAW. SEss. LAWS 942, 945 provides:
Section 3. This Act shall not apply to any cause of action which accrued,
rights and duties that matured, penalties that were incurred, or proceedings that
were begun, prior to July 1, 1988.
Section 4. No action shall be maintained under this Act for any existing
projects, programs, or any other governmental activities which are continuing,
and which were begun, completed, or established prior to July 1, 1988.
Section 5. The governor shall present a proposal to the legislature to resolve
controversies which arose between August 21, 1959 and the date of this Act,
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year deadline,27 4 the governor presented a proposal entitled, "An Action
Plan to Address Controversies Under the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust
and the Public Land Trust.' '275 The legislature approved the plan by
resolution, thereby apparently forestalling any right to sue.276
Upon approval, the governor created a Task Force consisting of the
heads of the DHHL, the Department of Land and Natural Resources,
and the Office of State Planning, all advised by the State Attorney
relating to the Hawaiian home lands trust under Article XII, sections 1, 2, and
3 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii implementing sections 4 and 5(f)
of the Admission Act (Act of March 18, 1959, Public Law 86-3, 73 Stat. 4),
and the Native Hawaiian public trust under Article XII, sections 4, 5, and 6
of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii implementing section 5(f) of the
Admission Act. If,
(1) both of the following occur:
(a) The governor fails to present a proposal to the legislature prior to the
convening of the 1991 legislature in regular session; and
(b) No other means of resolving such controversies is otherwise provided by law
by July 1, 1991; or
(2) All three of the following occur:
(a) The governor presents a proposal;
(b) A resolution calling for the rejection of the governor's proposal is adopted
by two thirds vote of the house introducing such resolution; and
(c) No other means of resolving such controversies is otherwise provided by law,
by July 1, 1991, then in the event of the occurrence of either (1)(a) and (b) or
(2)(a), (b) and (c), notwithstanding sections 3 and 4 of this Act, a claim for
actual damages under this Act which accrued between August 21, 1959, and
the date of this Act may be instituted no later than June 30, 1993, provided
that the filing of a claim for actual damages in an administrative proceeding
before June 30, 1993, shall toll the statute of limitations until ninety days after
the date the decision is rendered in the administrative proceeding.
1988 HAW. SESS. LAWS 942, 945 (1988).
One state senator who played a major role in the passage of the Act noted his
disappointment in limiting the immunity waiver to prospective breaches. Many prob-
lems concerning the trusts predate and, therefore are not covered by, the Native
Hawaiian Judicial Relief Act. Despite this concern, the senator expressed confidence
that the Governor would propose a sufficient resolution of past abuses. Teruya, supra
note 37, at 904.
274 Id.
211 OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, AN ACTION PLAN TO ADDRESS
CONTROVERSIES UNDER THE HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS TRUST AND THE PUBLIC LAND
TRUST (1991).
276 Arguably, the governor's plan did not satisfy the
requirements of S 5 of the Act since the plan merely proposed a "process to resolve"
past breaches rather than a resolution of those breaches. Teruya, supra note 37, at
915.
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General.2 77 As a result of the first part of its deliberations, the Task
Force recommended, and the Hawaii State Legislature approved, pay-
ment of $12 million in settlement for the State's illegal use of 29,000
acres of Hawaiian Homelands since statehood. Ka'ai'ai v. Drake27
challenged in state court the propriety of the settlement process. The
Native Hawaiian plaintiffs in Ka'ai'ai asserted that the Task Force's
multiple internal conflicts of interest, and its exclusion of an independ-
ent representative of trust beneficiaries in the negotiation settlement
process, constituted a breach of trust and a violation of the principle
of Native Hawaiian self-determination. 279 As a result of the suit and
277 This Task Force is the entity created by the Governor's proposal. It is responsible
for resolving claims against the State for the illegal use of Hawaiian home lands from
August 21, 1959 to June 30, 1988. The legislature, by resolution, declared that the
Task Force satisfied the conditions set forth in HAW. REV. STAT. § 673. However, if
the Task Force, for whatever reason, fails in its mission, then DHHL (but not trust
beneficiaries) obtains the right to sue the State for breaches occurring during this
period. See OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 275.
278 Civil no. 92-3742-10 (1st Cir. Haw., October 1992).
279 Ka'ai'ai v. Drake, initiated by Homeland trust beneficiaries, resulted in an
agreement that required the immediate payment of $5 million to DHHL and the
appointment of an independent representative for trust beneficiaries in future Task
Force negotiations of DHHL's claims against the State. Ka'ai'ai involved breach of
trust and procedural due process claims by Charles Ka'ai'ai, Alice Aiwohi, Noelani
Joy and Robert Asing against the State of Hawai'i and the Hawaiian Homelands
commissioners, among others. Those claims were informed by the concept of Native
Hawaiian self-determination. Ka'ai'ai, Aiwohi, Joy and Asing, Homelands Trust
beneficiaries, challenged the process by which the State had been attempting to resolve
DHHL claims against the State for illegal use of Homelands from Statehood to 1984.
Pursuant to the Native Hawaiian Trusts Judicial Relief Act, the State administration
created a Task Force to negotiate and resolve those and other related claims in lieu
of conferring upon DHHL a right to sue the State. See supra note 277 and accompanying
text. The Task Force was comprised of the Office of State Planning (representing the
State as active wrongdoer in the illegal use of Homelands) and the Director of DHHL
(arguably a passive wrongdoer in allowing the illegal use), both of whom were advised
by the State Attorney General's office. The Task Force denied Native Hawaiian
community organizations' explicit request to participate on the Task Force. When the
DHHL was poised to receive payment from the State in settlement of claims, based
on Task Force "recommendations," and sign a broad release waiving past and future
claims, Ka'ai'ai, et. al. sued in federal court asserting the principle of Native Hawaiian
self-determination in resolving trust claims against the State, and alleging a breach of
trust in the exclusion of Native Hawaiian participation on the Task Force. Plaintiffs'
section 1983 claim was vigorously opposed by the State on procedural grounds. See
supra Part III for a description of the procedural obstacles faced by Native Hawaiians
in federal court. During the preliminary injunction hearing, plaintiffs voluntarily
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legislation, an independent representative of Homelands beneficiaries
has been appointed to the Task Force. Task Force deliberations are
continuing.180
dismissed their suit. They then filed suit in state court, relying in principal part on
Pele Defense Fund v. Paty (see supra Part IP) which had been decided by the Hawai'i
Supreme Court just a few days earlier. State circuit court Judge Patrick Yim granted
plaintiffs' temporary restraining order request, enjoining execution .of the release and
payment of the settlement amount. The State defendants thereafter, in a partial
settlement, agreed to withdraw the release and to pay over the settlement amount
without requiring a DHHL waiver of claims. The parties agreed to continue litigation
over plaintiffs' claim for court appointment of an independent representative to the
Task Force to represent Homelands Trust beneficiaries. The circuit court then granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment on that claim on political question grounds.
The defendants, however, agreed to defer seeking entry of a final judgment while state
legislation was pending concerning authorization of the court's appointment of the
independent representative. Ultimately, the legislation passed and the parties agreed
to a process for the court's appointment of the independent representative and to
convert the case to a class action. The class action was certified with subclasses and
subclass counsel (representing beneficiaries on homestead land; beneficiaries with
homestead awards who were precluded from occupancy pending infrastructure im-
provements; and homestead waitlist beneficiaries). On August 13, 1993, Circuit Court
Judge Virginia Lea Crandall appointed Edward King as independent representative.
Mr. King is the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Federated States
of Micronesia.
Co-authors Yamamoto and Kalama were members of the legal team representing
plaintiffs in the litigation. Co-author Haia provided research assistance to independent
representative King.
280 Individual trust beneficiaries' claims arising out of state breaches of the Hawaiian
Homelands trust occurring between August 21, 1959 and June 30, 1988 are handled
by HAW. REV. STAT. 5 674 (1988), Individual Claims Resolution Under The Hawaiian
Home Lands Trust.
A "beneficiary" is defined as "any person eligible to receive benefits of homesteading
and related programs from the Hawaiian Home Lands trust." HAW. REV. STAT. §§
674-2 (1991). Only "individual beneficiaries" are afforded the S 674 right to panel
review and, subsequently, if an "individual beneficiary" becomes an "aggrieved
individual claimant," the right to sue. HAW. REV. STAT. 5§ 674-1 (1991) and 674-17
(amd. 1993). This class of claimants is nore limited than the class described in §S
673-2(a) which permits actions by native Hawaiian organizations as well as individuals.
Chapter 674 establishes an individual claims review panel to evaluate post-statehood,
pre-July 1, 1988 Homelands breach of "actual damage" trust claims by individual
beneficiaries. Like Chapter 673, Chapter 674 precludes awards of punitive and
consequential damages. All claims must be filed with the panel for review by August
31, 1993. Each individual damage claim, if not consolidated, will be heard before the
five member panel. The panel, acting as a advisory body, will then transmit reports
to the governor and legislature, "at least twenty days prior to the convening" of the
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B. Limited Remedies, Limited Rights to Sue
At first glance Chapter 673's "right to sue" appears to provide
Native Hawaiians with a statutory vehicle for redress of past trust
breaches, for presently enforcing Native Hawaiian land trust rights,
and for deterring future State trust breaches. Chapter 673, however,
places formidable stumbling blocks on the path to the state courthouse.
A continuing Homelands trust breach that arose between August 21,
1959 and June 30, 1988 is not actionable. As previously discussed,
Chapter 673 assigns to the governor the task of resolving those claims.
2 8 1
Actionable claims accruing between July 1, 1988 and July 1, 1990,
and not filed by June 30, 1992, are time-barred. The notice and
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirements, and the immunities
delineated in § 673-1(b), erect procedural and substantive defenses for
State officials.2 8
2
legislative sessions of 1993 and 1994, "regarding the merits of each claim
including an estimate of the probable award of actual damages or recommended
corrective action." HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 674-1 (amd. 1993). The legislature, after
review of the panel's recommendations, may then make compensatory awards, enact
further legislation, or take any other action it deems appropriate. HAW. REV. STAT.
§S 674-1(C) (amd. 1993). Chapter 674 does not mandate that the legislature follow
the panel's recommended action in any case.
A claimant who is not satisfied with the action taken by the legislature with regard
to his individual claim may then initiate an action in the Hawaii circuit courts. HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 674-1(2) (amd. 1993) and 674-17 (amd. 1993). Such actions must be
initiated between October 1, 1994 and September 30, 1996. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 674-
17 (amd. 1993) and 674-19 (amd. 1993).
2'1 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
282 HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 673-1(b) provides that "This waiver shall not apply to the
following:
(1)The acts or omissions of the State's officers and employees, even though such
acts or omissions may not realize maximum revenues to the Hawaiian home
lands trust or native Hawaiian public trust, so long as each trust is administered
in the sole interest of the beneficiaries; provided that nothing herein shall prevent
the State from taking action which would provide a collateral benefit to non-
beneficiaries, but only so long as the primary benefits are enjoyed by benefici-
aries, and the collateral benefits do not detract from nor reduce the benefits
enjoyed by the beneficiaries
(2) Any claim for which a remedy is provided elsewhere in the laws of the State;
and
(3) Any claim arising out of the acts or omissions of the members of the board
of trustees, officers and employees of the office of Hawaiian affairs, except as
provided in section 10-16.
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 673-1(b) (1988).
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Most significant, Chapter 673 remedies are sharply limited, creating
disincentives to sue. Land or monetary damages resulting from trustees'
breaches will be awarded only to the trust itself, that is, returned to
the control of the possibly breaching trustees, and not to any individ-
ually injured beneficiary.21 3 A beneficiary will only be allowed to recover
"actual" damages sustained, which ordinarily will be minimal, even
though that beneficiary has proven that the trust had been badly
damaged.28 4 Even if the beneficiary proves that the breach precluded
her from receiving an award of homestead land or from moving onto
land earlier awarded, 285 Chapter 673 appears to leave her remediless.
For this person the breach continues. Her incentive to litigate a costly
and time-consuming suit is nil.28 6 Chapter 673 remedies cannot place
her on a homestead lot or order the Hawaiian Homes Commissioners
(or State actors as trustees of the Ceded Lands trust) to take specific
structural actions for the benefit of trust beneficiaries.
At bottom, the State as trustee risks little under Chapter 673 when
it breaches its fiduciary obligations to trust beneficiaries. History reveals
why Native Hawaiians and other indigenous peoples in America have
been appropriately wary of western-based legal systems. 2 7 It is perhaps
for these reasons that Native Hawaiians' initial "wait and see" attitude
toward the "right to sue" Act has changed. That attitude has now
turned to one of apparent futility.288
218 HAW. REV. STAT. S 673-4(a) (1988).
181 HAW. REV. STAT. S% 673-4(a) and (b) (1988).
285 Since authorized relief is limited specifically to restorative damages or a return
of the illegally taken land, the extent of state court injunctive relief power is uncertain.
Can the courts order injunctive relief to stop a trust breach for mismanagement of
trust land, for inadequate funding of infrastructure or, for failing to properly award
Homelands parcels to beneficiaries? A strong argument can be fashioned that a state
court retains an inherent equitable power to issue injunctions even though injunctive
relief is omitted from the list of statutory remedies. What remains uncertain, even if
injunctive relief power is recognized, is the scope of that power.
286 HAW. REV. STAT. § 673-5(b) (1988) does, however, allow the court, "as it
deems just," to award "a prevailing plaintiff . . . a reasonable sum for costs and
expenses incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees." HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 673-
5(b) (1988).
287 The Mahele of 1848, which applied private property concepts to Hawaii's
communal land base, and the Kuleana Act of 1850 illustrate the consequences visited
upon Hawaiians by the imposition of a western legal system. For an excellent analysis
and portrayal see KAME'ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES, supra note 22,
at 8-16. See also MACKENZIE, supra note 22, at 3-10, (1990).
28 Teruya, supra note 37, at 920 (observing "after passage of the Native Hawaiian
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EPILOGUE
"Hawaiians Must Have Control Over Trust and Ceded Lands.
' 28 9
"Recent Hawaiian Land Occupations. ' 290 'The Beaches Are Our
Trust Judicial Relief Act in 1988, the Native Hawaiian community adopted a wait
and see attitude.") The State's stated purpose in passage of the Native Hawaiian
Trusts Judicial Relief Act, to redress past wrongs and discourage present and future
abuses, loses much of its force when considered along with the State's seemingly
determined litigation efforts to restrict significantly Native Hawaiians' right to sue the
State. See Teruya, id. at 922. To date no claims have been litigated under Chapter
673.
Hawaii Revised Statutes §§ 661-1(1) provides a possible additional avenue for Native
Hawaiian breach of trust claims. It waives the State's sovereign immunity for "[a]ll
claims against the State founded upon any statute of the State; or upon any regulation
of an executive department; or upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the
State[.]" Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 661-1(1) (19 ). In the Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian
Homes Comm'n, Civ. No. 89-244 (3rd Cir. 19 ), Native Hawaiian plaintiffs argued
that their claims were founded upon the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, which is
a "statute of the State" within the meaning of SS 661-1(1), and upon the regulations
governing the Hawaiian Homes Commission and Department of Hawaiian Home
Lands, which are "regulations of an executive department" also within the meaning
of S 661-1(1). They further argued that the Homeland Commission Act is a "contract,
expressed or implied, with the State" as set forth in §§ 661-1(1) because the State of
Hawaii adopted the Act as "a law of the State" and accepted trust provisions imposed
thereunder "as a compact with the United States." The plaintiffs therefore asserted
in the lower court that the State had waived its immunity from suit for Native
Hawaiians' breach of trust (breach of the compact) claims.
The theory underlying the Aged Hawaiians position was that §§ 661-1(1) is analogous
to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1992) and the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1505 (1982). In United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983), the Supreme Court
held that under the latter Act the United States waived its sovereign immunity over
certain claims by Indian tribes for money damages for the United States' breach of
trust duties. Such a waiver of immunity under §S 661-1(1), if recognized, would avoid
the prospective/retrospective relief conundrum of Eleventh Amendment immunity
analysis as well as the numerous procedural obstacles of the Trusts Judicial Relief
Act. The Hawaii appellate courts have yet to rule on the possibility of a §§ 661-1(1)
right to sue.
Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, Haw. , P.2d (Hawaii April 5, 1994) (Appeal
No. 16840) raises related questions concerning the methods under Hawaii law for
bringing an after-the-fact challenge to an agency action that is arguably unlawful. Bush
held that relief is not available via an administrative appeal under S 91-14 if the agency
was not required, by constitutional provision, statute, or administrative rule, to have
held a contested case hearing. Bush can thus be seen as, in some ways, the mirror
image of Punohu v. Sunn, 66 Haw. 489, 666 P.2d 1133 (1983), in which the Hawaii
Sirpreme Court earlier held that, where a "contested case" is mandated under statute,
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Birth Sands."' 2 9 "Struggle Continues Over Molokai Pipeline [across
Homelands]. "292 The news headlines continue. And Native Hawaiian
land controversies continue to head toward the courts. How will the
courts, federal and state, perform in the context of these increasingly
frequent and intensifying controversies? For the foreseeable future, the
federal courts, at the State's behest, appear to have all but foreclosed
Native Hawaiian breach of trust claims for meaningful structural relief.
The Hawai'i Legislature's Native Hawaiian "Right to Sue" Act may
now fairly be characterized as a complete failure. The Hawai'i Supreme
Court's 1992 Pele decision focused on state constitutional provisions
concerning the land trusts and opened state courthouse doors. It also
signaled sensitivity to customary Native Hawaiian cultural practices by
expanding gathering rights outside of the ahupua'a of residence. 93 By
adopting federal immunity strictures, however, the Court in Pele then
appeared to restrict sharply Native Hawaiians' new-found right to sue
for land trust breaches.
From one vantage point, the federal courts, for a variety of possible
reasons, may be indirectly ceding dispute resolution (and transformation
power concerning Native Hawaiian breach of land trust claims) to the
state courts. From that same vantage point, the Hawai'i state courts
a challenge to agency action must proceed under § 91-14, and relief under S 632-1 is
unavailable. On the other hand, Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City and County of
Honolulu, Haw. , 858 P.2d 726 (Hawaii September 16, 1993) (Appeal No. 15923),
indicates that declaratory relief is available in an action under S 632-1 where no
contested case hearing is mandated. Accordingly, it appears that relief under § 91-14
is available only if the agency is mandated to provide a contested case hearing (in
which case that remedy must be used), whereas relief under §632-1 and/or § 91-7 will
be available in other cases.
9 Mililani Trask, Hawaiians Must Have Control Over Trust And Ceded Lands, HONOLULU
STAR BULLETIN, March 9, 1994, at A-19 (letter to the editor by Mililani Trask,
governor of Ka Lahui Hawaii, reacting to a proposal by the editor of the Star Bulletin,
A. A. Smyser).
290 Recent Hawaiian Land Occupations, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, February 20, 1994,
at B-1.
29 Lilikala Kame'eleihiwa, A Hawaiian Point of View: The Beaches Are Our Birth Sands,
THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, February 20, 1994, at B-i.
292 Struggle Continues Over Moloka'i Pipeline, KE KIA'I, March 1, 1994, vol. 5, no. 3,
at 10-11 (describing suit by Molokai homesteaders, residents, groups and Chamber of
Commerce to stop private resort developer's installation of a large water pipeline which
would deplete available ground water resources that could be used in Homelands
development).
292 See supra note 179 (discussing Pele's expansion of Kalipi gathering rights on
undeveloped private land).
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may now be struggling with reconceptualizing the appropriate state
judicial function in light of dramatically changing circumstances. Amidst
the accelerating Native Hawaiian self-determination movement, Native
Hawaiian claimants have stoked the fires of change by asserting legal
claims concerning trust lands in both traditional and expansive frame-
works (which include the assertion of the relevance of international
human rights norms).
A significant question raised by these changing circumstances is how
decisions about court process, including courthouse entry, will mediate
or transform the often conflicting cultural messages underlying Native
Hawaiian land trust controversies. 294 This question in turn implicates
the cultural performances of state courts in handling such controversies.
Will the stories developed and told there lift up hidden voices and
portray the complexity of history and culture? And with what impacts
on decisional outcomes, dominant societal narratives and existing power
arrangements? Will the courts be able to serve a jurisgenerative func-
tion? 29 5 Or should Native Hawaiians turn to, or create, some other
law center for addressing their historically and culturally-rooted land
claims?
Nell Jessup Newton, in writing about the future of Native American
stories and the legal process, broadens the context for these questions.
We have substituted "Native Hawaiian" for "Indian" in her passage
quoted below to emphasize the appropriateness of her observations to
Native Hawaiians, without, we believe, changing her meaning.
[T]he cases represent stories not just of individual persons but of peoples
who continue to struggle to maintain their right to exist separately in a
29 As Nell Jessup Newton points out, court access alone for indigenous groups
assures little over time. How claims are handled and transformed are also salient
issues. The
"single greatest influence on the development of modern Indian law was the
opening of the federal courts to Indian tribes in 1965... The federal district
courts [during the heyday of judicial activism] provided forums willing to listen
to new doctrines in Indian law. . Some of these cases, in turn, had a salutary
impact on Indian claims in the claims courts. This impact, however has not
been far-reaching enough to result in significant changes for aggrieved tribes.
Widening the array of courts to which Indians can bring their claims has simply
not erased the rules that, by twists and turns, seem so often to result in no
recovery for Indian tribes."
Newton, Indian Claims, supra note 18, at 851-52.
295 See supra note 160 (describing Robert Cover's use of the term "jurisgenerative,"
meaning affirming law created by communities, and its antithesis, "jurispathic,"
meaning destruction of community created law).
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world still waiting for them to assimilate. The claims from which these
stories spring represent ancient grievances as well as recent wrongs. By
listening to these stories carefully and relating them to those in power,
it may be possible to begin to work through to real resolutions of [Native
Hawaiian] grievances, resolutions that involve some land and recognition
of real power.
296
296 Newton, Indian Claims, supra note 18, at 854. Newton also poses essential questions
about the process and structure of alternative forums.
"To make these strategic decisions, it is necessary to consider not only the
substantive law applied in each court, but also the structure of that court and
the process employed within it. .[I]f the old system appeared biased in favor
of the Government. . ., does the new system remove the appearance or reality
of bias, either because of the way it has been constituted or because of the
procedures adopted? If not, should tribes try to avoid these courts even more
than they do now? Or, is the alternative similarly flawed?"
Id. at 839.

